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ABSTRACT 
Exact Semantics for Indicative Conditionals 
 
This thesis e[WendV KiW Fine¶V e[acW VemanWicV and accoXnW of coXnWerfacWuals to non-
habitual, non-predictive indicative conditionals. First, I proYide Fine¶V e[poViWion of 
exact semantics and his extension to counterfactuals. Later, I introduce a notion of 
context into the semantics and provide the truth-conditions for indicative conditionals 
by employing this notion of context. Afterwards, I turn to the logic of indicative 
conditionals under exact semantics and discuss the principles and inference rules which 
raise disagreements between variably strict and strict conditionals accounts. The 
account I provide shows its promise by validating a plausible combination of principles 
and strikes a balance between variably strict and strict conditional theories. I discuss 
certain principles in logic of indicative conditionals under exact semantics in detail and 
show how the present account validates the plausible combination of them. In the end, I 
draw comparisons between the viable theories for indicatives and the present one, and 
argue that the present account takes the advantage in several respects. 
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ÖZET 
Bildirme KoúXl Cmleleri ioin KeVinlik SemanWi÷i 
 
BX We]de KiW Fine¶Õn keVinlik VemanWi÷ini Ye bXnXn dilek koúXl cmlelerine X\gXlanÕúÕnÕ 
alÕúkanlÕk ve Wahmin ioerme\en bildirme koúXl cmlelerine X\gXla\aca÷Õm. ølk |nce KiW 
Fine¶Õn keVinlik VemanWi÷inin Ye onXn dilek koúXl cmlelerine X\gXlanÕúÕnÕ 
|]eWle\ece÷im. ArdÕndan VemanWi÷e formal bir ba÷lam kaYramÕ WanÕmla\Õp bX kaYramÕ 
kullanarak bildirme koúXl cmleleri ioin do÷rXlXk koúXllarÕnÕ WanÕmla\aca÷Õm. Do÷rXlXk 
koúXllarÕnÕ WanÕmladÕkWan Vonra koúXl cmlelerinin manWÕk kXrallarÕna d|np bi]im 
VemanWi÷imi]in hangi oÕkarÕm kXrallarÕnÕ deVWekle\ip hangilerini deVWekleme\ece÷ini 
WarWÕúaca÷Õm. Bi]im Weorimi]in di÷erlerine na]aran gol \anlarÕ koúXl cmlelerinin 
manWÕ÷Õnda orWa\a oÕkWÕ÷ÕnÕ g|rece÷i]. Bi]im Weorimi]in úX ]amana kadar orWa\a aWÕlmÕú 
kaWÕ Ye monoWonik olma\an kaWÕ koúXl cmleleri Weorilerinin deVWekledi÷i makXl olma\an 
kXrallarÕ deVWekleme]ken, onlarÕn aYanWajlarÕnÕ orWa\a oÕkardÕklarÕ oÕkarÕm kXrallarÕnÕ da 
destekleyerek liWeraWrdeki Weorilere kÕ\aVla güol bir koúXl cmleVi manWÕ÷Õ orWa\a 
ko\dX÷XnX g|VWerece÷im. Son olarak genel olarak Weorimi]in di÷er Weorilere na]aran 
nerede dXrdX÷XnX WarWÕúarak We]i VonlandÕraca÷Õm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Kit Fine recently started fleshing out a YerVion of WrXWhmaker VemanWicV called ³e[acW 
VemanWicV´ (2012a; 2016; 2017). He thought it an alternative to possible world semantics 
to cater to its faltering aspects. As opposed to disjoint, complete and maximal nature of 
possible worlds at which statements are true or false, Fine takes (possibly) joint and 
partial fragments of worlds which make statements true or false, hence the name 
³WrXWhmaker.´ Fine callV WheVe fragmenWV ³VWaWeV.´ The expectation is that this transition 
to a finer-grained framework will endow one with richer tools to engage natural 
language semantics with and, at the outset, it seems that this expectation is not let down, 
since Fine argues that exact semantics provides a potent array of tools for a variety of 
natural language phenomena such as partial content, subject matter, imperatives and 
scalar implicature (2017, §2). One of Fine¶V applications is interesting in particular²
counterfactuals. In his 2012 papers, Fine argues that a contradiction can be drawn from 
LeZiV¶ accoXnW for coXnWerfacWXalV (1973) by employing additional plausible 
assumptions compatible with counterfactual reasoning and shows that exact semantics 
can positively resolve this contradiction (2012a; 2012b). Though Fine¶V account seems 
to require further elucidation and interpretation of the employed relations and tools 
which captures counterfactual reasoning, his groundwork is ripe for further development 
to capture conditional reasoning in general. I aim to provide the clarification and extend 
it to an additional application²indicative conditionals. Hence, the ultimate aim in this 
thesis is to extend exact semantics to provide the truth-conditions for indicative 
2 
 
conditionals and argue that the account can be a competitor to several other accounts on 
the market such as SWalnaker¶V (1968), GillieV¶ (2009; 2010) and Kratzer¶V (1986; 2012) 
in terms of its logic and other theoretical virtues. 
The plan of the thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, I provide an exposition of exact 
semantics in general, as Fine develops it (2017). In Chapter 3, I discuss how Fine 
extends his semantics to counterfactuals (2012a). Since his paper on counterfactuals 
precedes his general exposition of exact semantics, I take an anachronistic approach. 
However, this turns out to be more illuminating, since most of the ideas in 2012 paper 
becomes clearer, only when we view them as natural extensions of exact semantics. I 
keep the exposition as detailed as possible both in order to make the thesis self-
contained and due to the framework being fairly new in the literature. In Chapter 4, I 
discuss how indicative and counterfactual conditionals are distinguished in general and 
present a way of capturing this distinction by introducing further tools into exact 
semantics. For this purpose, I develop a notion of context, which represents the 
preceding and mutually presupposed information in a conversational background. This 
allows us to capture the semantic distinction of indicatives from counterfactuals. By 
employing the notions, I have provided and in accordance with how I set up the 
semantics, I provide the truth-conditions for indicatives based on the truth-conditions 
Fine provides for counterfactuals. In Chapter 5, I turn to the logic of indicative 
conditionals under our account and show how certain principles are valid and other 
principles are invalid. Accordingly, I will comparatively show where the account stands 
with respect to other theories for indicatives in terms of which principles are validated 
and how certain problematic inferences which are valid under other theories are blocked 
under the current account. Lastly, I conclude by summarizing the features of the account 
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by discussing where it stands in general as a prospective account for indicative 
conditionals and noting the wanting aspects of the account, as it stands, such as inability 
to embed conditionals in the antecedent position, capture adverbs of quantification and 
habitual conditionals. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRUTHMAKER SEMANTICS 
 
Exact semantics is a subdivision of truthmaker semantics. Truthmaker semantics is an 
umbrella term which is subdivided into various categories. First, there is the general 
clausal-objectual distinction, which is determined by the nature of truthmakers. For 
instance, Davidson (1967) takes the clausal approach. In DaYidVon¶V approach, 
truthmakers are not objects on the side of reality, but clauses or sentences which 
specifies the meaning of the statement or when the statement is true. The second major 
branch is the objectual approach which is mostly dominated by possible world 
semantics. However, possible world semantics was not the only game in town. There 
were several approaches which worked with smaller-than-world objects, which Fine 
callV in general ³VWaWel\ approach.´ Stately approach is mostly known and disseminated 
in Whe liWeraWXre b\ BarZiVe & Perr\¶V canonical Zork (1983). Fine¶V VemanWicV also falls 
on the side of stately approaches. If we are to stick ZiWh Fine¶V claVVificaWion (2017, p. 
558), stately approach also consists of three subdivisions which are determined by the 
scope of their truthmakers. In an expanding order of their scope, these are called exact, 
inexact and loose truthmakers. Among WheVe Whree approacheV, Fine¶V approach fallV 
within the exact approach. Exact approach seeks some complete and exhaustive 
relevance between the truthmaker and the statement made true by the truthmaker. With 
this briefest of the brief introduction to truthmaker semantics, I Zill VWarW ZiWh Fine¶V 
exposition of exact truthmakers and show how other categories of truthmakers are 
recursively defined in terms of exact ones. 
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2.1 Exact semantics 
Let us start with an analogy. In possible world semantics, a standard frame is an ordered 
pair ሺܹ, ܴሻ where ܹ is the set of possible worlds and R is usually a binary relation on 
ܹ, which determines how possible worlds are accessible from one another. A standard 
model for a propositional modal logic is an ordered triple ሺܹ, ܴ, ݒሻ with ݒ being the 
valuation function which assigns sentential letters and formulas of the relevant language 
to truth values in each world. Even though we call them ³poVVible ZorldV,´ one doeV noW 
need complete ontological commitment to possible worlds to the extent to which David 
Lewis committed (1986). For instance, Kripke treats possible worlds merely as indices 
or nodes of evaluation, which are purely mathematical objects, for formulas of a given 
language without interpreting possible worlds in a fully fleshed-out form (1963, p. 69). 
However, no matter which conception one adopts for possible worlds, it will be a 
common assumption or an implicitly accepted definition that possible worlds are 
maximal and consistent (³VeWV of propoViWionV,´ ³ways WhingV coXld haYe been´, ³« 
disjoint entities´ or what have you).1 As opposed to a possible world frame, Fine adopts 
a frame ሺܵ, ⊑ሻ called ³state space” where ܵ is the set of all states and ⊑ is a parthood 
relation on ܵ. States can be thought as fragments of possible worlds. Conceived in this 
way, they correspond to a wide-ranging family of truthmakers such as facts, events, 
                                                 
1 ³Ma[imal and conViVWenW´ iV a common Za\ Wo deVcribe ZhaW a poVVible Zorld iV. ConjXncWion of 
maximal and consistent basically means that for every statement P, either P or ¬P will be true at a given 
world and never both. The former satisfies the condition of maximality and the latter²consistency. Even 
an axiomatic definition given to possible worlds meets these two criteria (see Zalta, 1993; 2014). I also 
want to note a general problem plaguing world and situation theory. There are several issues arising from 
each definition of worlds. For instance, taking them as maximal and consistent sets of propositions (see 
Adams, 1974; Kripke, 2017) leadV Wo Kaplan¶V parado[ (1995). M\ emphaViV iV on Whe condiWionV of 
maximality and consistency and not on ZhaW ³ma[imal´ and ³conViVWenW´ adjecWiYi]e, i.e. VeWV, objecWV eW 
cetera. If one wishes to remain clear of paradoxes or cardinality problems, she can take Zalta et al. (2014) 
construction of worlds, which are still maximal and consistent objects consisting of situations. They show 
that defining propositions and worlds in an object-theoretic framework renders their theory immune to 
parado[eV VXch aV RXVVell¶V (1903, appendi[ B, §500) and Kaplan¶V (1995). 
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beliefs, emotions, attitudes et cetera.2 By adopting a state space, the maximality 
requirement is dropped for the elements in our domain ܵ. Instead, elements of the 
domain can be parts of each other. 
In fact, this analogy is not completely accurate and we can be more precise. ܵ is 
the set of all states which includes impossible states as well as possible states, whereas 
ܹ is the set of possible worlds only. For instance, we have a state of its being the case 𝑃 
and ൓𝑃 or a VWaWe of FermaW¶V LaVW Theorem being falVe in ܵ, which are taken to be 
metaphysically impossible.3 Therefore, a better analogy would be a frame ሺ𝐴, ܴ) where 
𝐴 is the set of all worlds as opposed to merely possible ones. Of course, in such a model, 
there would be no logically valid formula, since we would have some impossible worlds 
where truth-functional tautologies would not hold. Moreover, we could not attach the 
necessity operator understood as truth in all worlds to any formula in such a model for 
the same reason, whereas the possibility operator would be attachable to every formula, 
contradictions included, since there will always be at least one world where even a truth-
functional inconsistency or contradiction would hold. In order to regain validity, we 
need to put ሺ𝐴, ܹ, ܴ) where ܹ is the set of possible worlds, which is a (proper) subset 
                                                 
2 We take not only facts or situations, but also beliefs, emotions and other metaphysically contentious 
entities as states, since our concern is with any type of statement in the natural language. For a statement 
VXch aV ³Ta\lan belieYeV WhaW dogV are MarWian agenWV,´ Whe VWaWe of Ta\lan¶V belieYing VXch-and-such will 
exist. 
3 Stalnaker and Lewis (1996; 1986 7n, 3) tentatively argued against the possible existence of impossible 
worlds on the grounds that it leads to a contradiction. However, the way they derive the contradiction 
assumes a bivalent background logic, which is exactly what is defined not to hold in impossible worlds or, 
at least, what is at stake at those worlds (see Priest et al. 2016). In other words, the purported existence of 
those worlds or meaningfulness of them exactly depends on the claim that this contradiction is derivable. 
So, it is in a sense self-defeating to attempt to prove the non-existence of impossible worlds by deriving a 
contradiction, because the existence of these worlds depends upon the derivability of this contradiction. 
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of 𝐴 and define logical validity on ܹ. For now, ሺܵ, ⊑ሻ is more similar to ሺ𝐴, ܴ) than to 
ሺܹ, ܴሻ.4 
It is best to assume that the reader is not familiar with some version of situation 
or truthmaker semantics and show intuitively both how states can be parts of each other 
and how they make statements true in an example. For instance, take the statement ³Da 
Vinci painted the Mona Lisa.´ This statement is made true by the state of Da Vinci 
having painted the Mona Lisa. However, we can imagine Da Vinci completing different 
tasks to paint the Mona Lisa and these correspond to different states as well. For 
instance, the state of Da Vinci having painted the Mona Lisa contains other states such 
as the state of Da Vinci having painted the right pillar of the Mona Lisa, the locks of hair 
et cetera. In a possible world where Da Vinci painted the Mona Lisa without painting the 
right pillar, the statement ³Da Vinci painWed the Mona Lisa´ Zill be made true by a 
different composition of states, i.e. one which does not contain the state of Da Vinci 
having painted the right pillar. Furthermore, all Da Vinci did during the completion of 
the Mona Lisa was not to draw the Mona Lisa. Thus, looking down from above at the 
state of Da Vinci having painted the Mona Lisa, we will see that it is also part of a more 
comprehensive state such as Da Vinci having painted the Mona Lisa, taken a nap, read a 
tome, drunk water, et cetera. 
Technically, parthood relation among states is effected by a partial order. ⊑ is a 
partial order on S, which allows the elements of the domain to be parts of each other. We 
will interpret ³ݏ ⊑ ݐ´ aV ³ݏ is a part of ݐ.´ Being a partial order, ⊑ satisfies the following 
properties: 
                                                 
4 For a general review of models for all worlds which include non-normal or impossible worlds, refer to 
Priest, 1992 and 2001. 
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Reflexivity: ∀ݏ ∈ ܵ, ݏ ⊑ ݏ 
Anti-symmetry: ∀ݏ, ݐ ∈ ܵ, ݏ ⊑ ݐ & ݐ ⊑ ݏ implies ݏ ൌ ݐ. 
Transitivity: ∀ݏ, ݐ, ݑ ∈ ܵ, ݏ ⊑ ݐ & ݐ ⊑ ݑ implies ݏ ⊑ ݑ. 
Though we have shown how states can be parts of each other, we have not demonstrated 
how different states can be conjoined. To continue with the same example: in order to 
get to the Mona Lisa in its full beauty, we need to bring VWaWeV of Da Vinci¶V painWing the 
locks, the pillars, the paths together. This is what is called ³fusion of states´. Fusion is 
best conceived of as the union of states. From a theoretical perspective, this fusion is 
taken to be the least upper bound for some subset of states. This means that for any 
given subset ܶ of ܵ, ݏ is an upper bound of ܶ if ∀ݐ ∈ ܶ, ݐ ⊑ ݏ and ݏ is a least upper 
bound if ݏ is an upper bound and for all upper bounds ݏ′ of ܶ, ݏ ⊑ ݏ′. We will represent 
fusion of states ݐଵ, … , ݐ௡ ∈ ܶ ⊆ ܵ as ݐଵ ⊔ … ⊔ ݐ௡. In order to secure that every subset of 
ܵ has a least upper bound we impose the following condition: 
Completeness: Every subset of ܵ has a least upper bound. 
This assures us of the fact that the fusion of any combination of states in the state space 
exists and relieves us of the requirement to define a separate operator ⊔ to capture 
fusion, since any possible fusion will correspond to some least upper bound in the state 
space. 
We have no distinction between possible and impossible states yet. ܵ contains 
boWh poVVible and impoVVible VWaWeV VXch aV Whe poVVible VWaWe of one¶V Walking and 
Zalking and Whe impoVVible VWaWe of one¶V Walking and being VilenW aW Whe Vame Wime. Fine 
modalizes the state space by putting ሺܵ, ܵ◊, ⊑ሻ where ܵ◊ ⊆ ܵ is the set of possible states. 
What this achieves is the distinction of possible states from impossible states. Remember 
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the analogy above; we now have an analogue of ሺ𝐴, ܹ, ܴሻ where ܹ is the set of all 
possible worlds. If we wanted to define validity in a given model for our frame, we 
would do so with a modalized state space rather than a bare state space, because states in 
ܵ െ ܵ◊, namely, impossible states, would stymie any formula from being logically valid. 
It seems that while providing the general framework, Fine wants to cast as wide a net as 
possible in order to give one the freedom of choice to tailor the framework to her 
specific needs.5 
Modalizing the state space allows one to define two important notions, 
compatibility and incompatibility. If the fusion of two states ݏ ⊔ ݐ is a possible state, i.e. 
ݏ ⊔ ݐ ∈ ܵ◊, they will be compatible and if not, i.e. ݏ ⊔ ݐ ∉ ܵ◊, they will be incompatible. 
In order to block impossible states from being parts of possible states, Fine imposes the 
following restriction (Fine, 2017, p. 560): 
Downward Closure under Part: ∀ݏ ∈ ܵ◊, ∀ݐ ∈ ܵ, if ݐ ⊑ ݏ, then ݐ ∈ ܵ◊ 
This closure is downward in the sense that impossible states cannot be parts of possible 
states, but it is possible that possible states are parts of impossible states.6 
 For our purposes, Completeness is too loose. It gives us too many fusions and 
some of these fusions are incompatible and impossible states such as for any statement 
𝑃, 𝑃 ∧ ൓𝑃-states. Now we have the notion of compatibility, we can impose a more rigid 
constraint on our possible state space than Completeness. In a sense, this is forced upon 
us, because we will have no business with impossible states for indicative conditionals. 
We rigidify Completeness by putting: 
                                                 
5 For instance, if one were to engage counterpossibles, pinpointing which worlds are metaphysically 
impossible and which worlds are epistemically impossible would play a vital role. 
6 For instance, consider the states ݏ, ݄ and ݀ for one¶V being happ\, Xnhapp\ and Vleep\ reVpecWiYel\. ݏ ⊔
݄ ⊔ ݀ is obviously impossible, but it contains ݄ ⊔ ݀, which is possible. 
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Bounded Completeness: Every consistent subset of ܵ◊ has a least upper bound. 
By a consistent subset, I mean that all of the states in the subset are compatible with 
each other. It is easy to see that the least upper bound for this subset is in ܵ◊ as well. 
This along with Downward Closure prevents impossible states from having fusions in 
the possible state space. For instance, though both the state of a ball being smooth and 
the state of its being not smooth will be possible states separately, their fusion will be an 
impossible state and will have no fusion in ܵ◊, though it will have a fusion in ܵ. To 
reiterate, this choice is not forced on us and it is just what is proper for our purpose of 
providing a semantics for conditionals. If we wanted to deal with counterpossibles, we 
would be forced to include incompatible states and fusions thereof in our state space. 
Within a possible state space, we can give a definition of what a possible world is 
by employing the notion of incompatibility. We briefly discussed above that no matter 
which position we adopt in terms of what possible worlds are, they share the property of 
being maximal and consistent. We can capture these properties within a possible state 
space with the following definition: 
World State: ݓ is a world state only if ݓ is a possible state and any state ݏ ∈ ܵ is 
either a part of ݓ or incompatible with ݓ. In symbols, ݓ is a world state only if ݓ ∈ ܵ◊ 
and ∀ݏ ∈ ܵ, either ݏ ⊑ ݓ or ݏ ⊔ ݓ ∉ ܵ◊ (Fine, 2017, p. 561). 
Since world states are possible, there will be no incompatible states which are 
parts of world states and we will not introduce impossible worlds into our possible state 
space. Moreover, they positively either exclude or include every other state (ibid). The 
former property preserves the consistency requirement of the definition of worlds and 
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the latter satisfies the maximality requirement. By this way, we can create a copy of the 
domain of possible worlds within the possible state space. 
If we impose the restriction that every possible state be part of some world state, 
then we will make ሺܵ, ܵ◊, ⊑ሻ a world space or ܹ-space where world states do not leave 
any logical space of possible states uncharted. What this achieves in effect is that the 
logical space of possible states will exhaustively map onto the ܹ-space and what this 
means, in turn, is that whenever a possible state verifies a statement, that statement will 
be verified by some world state. Of course, we could have assumed a state space or a 
possible state space without assuming a ܹ-space. We are assuming a ܹ-space 
specifically because we will be dealing with conditionals, as Fine does for his 
counterfactual account (2012a, p. 236, fn. 18). Fine does not elucidate why he assumes a 
ܹ-space, but we can make clear why we are assuming a ܹ-space. At this point we have 
not said anything about conditionals, but we can give an intuitive explanation without 
going into detail. While evaluating conditionals, we keep certain parts of the world as 
they are and consider the world as if the antecedent of the conditional holds there and 
evaluate whether the consequent is true under these circumstances. The truth of a 
conditional depends not only upon which truth-value its atomic constituents have, but 
also upon under what conditions the consequent can be true together with the 
antecedent. This means that whenever we evaluate a conditional, we assess some 
relation between the antecedent and consequent, that is, whether they can be true at the 
same world. Therefore, we always need to assess a conditional relative to a world state. 
This is the reason why we are assuming a ܹ-space. 
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Let us now take a propositional language 𝐿 consisting of countably many 
propositional variables pଵ, pଶ …, and closed under the Boolean operators of negation ¬, 
disjunction ∨ and conjunction ∧.7 A modalized state space model on L will be a 
quadruple ൫ܵ, ܵ◊, ⊑, |•|൯ where |•| is a valuation function which maps each sentential 
variable of L to the ordered pair ሺܸ, 𝐹ሻ of subsets of ܵ where ܸ is for exact verifiers and 
𝐹 for exact falsifiers. In symbols, s ||- p୧ iff for some ݏ, ݏ ∈ |p୧|௏ where |p୧|ி represents 
the set of exact verifiers for pi and ݏ -|| p୧ iff for some ݏ, ݏ ∈ |p୧|ி where |p୧|ி represents 
the set of exact falsifiers. We require that no verifier of any statement be compatible 
with the falsifiers of that statement, i.e. for any ݏ ∈ |p୧|௏ and ݏ′ ∈ |p୧|ி, ݏ ⊔ ݏ′ ∉ ܵ◊, 
which is called Exclusivity (2017, p. 562). This precludes any statement from being both 
true and false. However, we do not impose what Fine calls Exhaustivity (2017, p. 562), 
which means that any statement is either true or false. Lack of Exhaustivity allows for 
truth-value gaps. This will turn the present account into a trivalent account, which lets 
indicative conditionals be true, false, or indeterminate. Up until now, we have been 
using the notions of verification and falsification without explication. Since these 
notions constitute the bedrock of the semantics at hand, we ought to put more flesh on 
their bones. 
 
                                                 
7 It would be good to pause here and fix the language L¶V orWhograph\. I Vhall XVe Vmall-capped letters 
pଵ, … , p୬ to denote sentential variables given in L, capital letters 𝑃, ܳ, ܴ, 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 to denote formulas which 
are formed out of the sentential variables, Boolean operators and conditional operators later to be defined 
into L. In the orthography of the proof theory, if a formula occurs at the left-hand side of a verification 
symbol, i.e. 𝑃 ||- ܳ, the verification symbol will denote entailment or consequence instead of verification; 
otherwise, it will denote verification types as introduced in the thesis. 
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2.2 Verification 
 
Verification is the basic notion of making a statement true. What verifies is a state and 
what is verified is a statement. For instance, the presence of some lantern on the table 
being alit verifies Whe VWaWemenW ³The lanWern on Whe Wable iV aliW´. Unlike possible world 
semantics which has one uniform notion of satisfaction or verification, our notion of 
verification comes in various forms and magnitudes: 
Exact verification: A state ݏ exactly verifies a statement 𝐴 (symbolized as ݏ ⊩ 𝐴) 
if ݏ is wholly relevant to the truth of the statement 𝐴. Intuitively, it is plausible to assume 
that an exact verifier for a statement is a state which does not contain any irrelevant 
parts to the statement. For instance, the state of rain will be wholly relevant to the truth 
of ³It is raining´, ZhereaV Whe VWaWe of rain and Zind Zill be releYanW more than to the 
truth of ³IW iV raining.´ 
Inexact verification: Inexact verification can be defined recursively on exact 
verification. A state ݏ inexactly verifies a statement 𝐴, if some state ݐ is a part of ݏ and ݐ 
exactly verifies 𝐴. In symbols, 
ݏ ∥൐ 𝐴, if there is a ݐ such that ݐ ⊑  ݏ, ݐ ⊩ 𝐴. The presence of rain and wind will be an 
inexacW Yerifier for Whe VWaWemenW ³It is raining,´ since the presence of rain is a part of it. 
Loose verification: Loose verification is a modal notion. A state loosely verifies a 
statement B if it is incompatible with any exact falsifier of the statement. In symbols, 
ݏ ⊨ 𝐵 if ∀ݐ ∈ |𝐵|ி, ݏ ⊔ ݐ ∉ ܵ◊ where |𝐵|ி is the set of exact falsifiers for B. Any state 
will loosely verify any tautology. For instance, the state of my brother crying will 
looVel\ Yerif\ Whe VWaWemenW ³eiWher iW iV VXnn\ or noW VXnn\,´ since nothing will falsify it. 
More importantly, by the definition of World State, if a world state verifies a statement, 
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it will always loosely verify it, since the world state will contain an exact verifier for the 
statement and, thus, it will be incompatible with its exact falsifier. 
It is also important to note that every exact verifier for a statement will also be an 
inexact verifier for the same statement due to the reflexivity of ⊑ and every inexact 
verifier for the same statement will be a loose verifier for the same statement, because it 
will be incompatible with the exact falsifiers of the same statement. Therefore, if we 
have an exact verifier for a statement, then we will also have the same verifier as a loose 
verifier for the statement. However, the transition from loose verifiers to the exact 
verifiers will not be valid, as the reader can easily verify for herself. 
There are three notions of consequence or entailment corresponding to three 
forms of verification (Fine, 2012a, pp. 235-236). If all the exact verifiers of a statement 
𝑃 are also the exact verifiers of ܳ, we will say ܳ is an exact consequence of 𝑃 or 𝑃 
exactly entails ܳ, i.e. 𝑃 ||- ܳ. The same goes for inexact and loose entailment. For 
instance, let ݌ and ݍ be exact verifiers for 𝑃 and ܳ respectively. Then 𝑃 ∧ ܳ will not 
exactly verify ܳ, i.e. 𝑃 ∧ ܳ ⊮ ܳ, since the exact verifier of 𝑃 ∧ ܳ, which is, say, ݌ ⊔ ݍ is 
not the exact verifier of ܳ, say, ݍ, but it contains an exact verifier for ܳ. Thus, though 
𝑃 ∧ ܳ ⊮ ܳ, 𝑃 ∧ ܳ will inexactly entail ܳ, i.e. 𝑃 ∧ ܳ ||൐ ܳ. 
The verification rules for atomic propositions, negation, conjunction and 
negations as Fine (2017, p. 562) provides them are as follows: For an arbitrary state ݏ:8 
 
(i)+ ݏ ||- 𝐴  iff ݏ ∈ |𝐴|ା 
(i)- ݏ -|| 𝐴  iff ݏ ∈ |𝐴|ି 
                                                 
8 I XVe ³-__´ for e[acW falVificaWion, Zhich correVpondV Wo YalXaWion fXncWion aVVigning sentential variables to 
a set of falsifiers. 
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(ii)+ ݏ ||- ൓𝐴  iff ݏ -|| 𝐴 
(ii)- ݏ -||൓𝐴  iff ݏ ||- 𝐴 
(iii)+ ݏ ||- 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 iff  ∃ݐ, ݑሺݏ = ݐ ⊔ ݑ & ݐ ||- 𝐴 & ݑ ||- B) 
(iii)- ݏ -|| 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  iff  either ݏ -|| 𝐴 or ݏ -|| 𝐵 or ݏ -|| 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 
(iv)+  ݏ ||- 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  iff  either ݏ ||- 𝐴 or ݏ ||- 𝐵 or ݏ ||- 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  
(iv)- ݏ -|| 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  iff  ∃ݐ, ݑሺݏ = ݐ ⊔ ݑ & ݐ -|| 𝐴 & ݑ -|| 𝐵)9 
 
Valuation function and verification rules provide the definition of propositionhood. In 
possible world semantics, we take a proposition to be the sets of possible worlds at 
which its corresponding statement is true, but do not specify the worlds at which it is 
false, because they will be the worlds at which it will not be true. For exact semantics, 
the idea is a bit more elaborate, because falsity cannot be defined upon complementation 
on the set of possible worlds:10 
Proposition: There are two ways we can define propositionhood. The unilateral 
conception of propositionhood requires that propositions be the sets of their exact 
verifiers; symbolically, for a statement 𝐴, |𝐴|௏or ஺ܸ ൌ ሼݏ ∈ ܵ: ݏ ⊩ 𝐴ሽ. The bilateral 
conception requires that propositions be the ordered pair ( ஺ܸ, 𝐹஺ሻ where 𝐹஺  is the exact 
falsifiers of 𝐴 or |𝐴|ி(Fine, 2017, p. 563). If we want to express 𝐴¶V falViW\, When Ze can 
                                                 
9 I have assumed an inclusive semantics from the outset, meaning exact verifiers for 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 are also exact 
verifiers for 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 and falsifiers for 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 are also falsifiers for 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵. I am using the formulation, as it is 
presented in (Fine & Jago, Forthcoming) 
10 The reader might be unfamiliar with this definition of falsity in possible world semantics. Roughly, we 
do not need to define falsity for propositions in possible world semantics, because a proposition will be 
falVe aW ZorldV Zhere iW iV noW WrXe and ³noW WrXe´ iV defined b\ complemenWaWion on Whe VeW of poVVible 
worlds. For instance, let ሺܹ, ܴ, ݒሻ be a generic model for a propositional language K and 𝐴 be a formula. 
If we denote truth in a world ݓ as ݒ௪ሺ𝐴ሻ ൌ 1 for some formula 𝐴 and denote the truth of 𝐴 in a set of 
some worlds ܵ ൌ ሼݓଵ, … , ݓ௡ሽ as ݒௌሺ𝐴ሻ ൌ 1, then for some set of possible worlds ܵ, ݒௌሺ𝐴ሻ ൌ 0 iff 
ݒௌ̅ሺ𝐴ሻ ൌ 1 where ܵ̅ represents the complement of ܵ on ܹ, ܹ െ ܵ, which are the set of worlds where 𝐴 is 
not true. 
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represent it as ሺ𝐹஺, ஺ܸሻ, that is, by changing the order of the elements in the tuple.  I will 
assume a unilateral conception of propositionhood throughout to simplify the exposition 
at first, but since falsifiers will become significant in defining a notion of context and 
certain other places, I will make use of falsifiers as well. There will be no theoretical 
inconsistency hinging on this choice. 
 Before concluding the exposition, I want to address one issue concerning the 
exact verifiers for negated statements or exact falsifiers for normal, unnegated 
statements. Does exact semantics not suffer from the same problem as a generic 
truthmaker account does, that is, positing truthmakers for the negation of a proposition? 
Fine mentions two ways of defining falsification (2017, p. 562): the first is to define it in 
terms of exact verification, i.e. an exact falsifier of a statement A is the exact verifier for 
the statement ൓𝐴. However, he realizes that it is not clear which sets of verifiers 
correspond to the negation of a proposition and, thus, takes exact falsification as another 
primitive notion similar to exact verification (ibid.). The general trouble with taking 
exact falsification as another primitive is that we seem to open a can of worms, that is, 
postulate truthmakers for the negations of propositions and it is far from clear what is on 
the side of the world which makes a staWemenW VXch aV ³No one VhoZed Xp at the 
meeting´ WrXe. However, Fine argues that we conflate the worries here: 
³Indeed, Whe general focXV of Whe WZo projecWV iV Yer\ differenW. If oXr aim 
is to understand the world, then our focus should be on the ultimate 
truthmakers, on what in the world ultimately makes something true, and 
the question of how the truthmakers make the statements of our language 
true is of no great concern. But if our aim is to understand language, then 
our focus should be on the immediate truthmakers, not the ultimate 
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truthmakers, and the question of how they make the statements of the 
language true will be of greatest concern.´ (Fine, 2017, p. 557) 
How convincing this distinction is up to the worry of the reader. If one is seeking a 
complete metaphysics + natural language semantics, which consists of a parsimonious 
metaphysics for truthmaking and complete truth-conditions for statements in the 
language, then this distinction is exactly what they would be arguing against. On the 
other hand, if one finds the division of labor in understanding the language and 
understanding the world justified, then they can rest content with positing exact falsifiers 
as another primitive notion in their semantics, since inflating or deflating the ontology is 
noW one¶V concern here. Since this is a side point for the project at hand, I will accept the 
distinction and take falsifiers as another primitive notion in the framework. 
 Let us summarize where we are before extending the semantics to 
counterfactuals. First, we distinguished three different versions of verification²exact, 
inexact and loose. As long as we take exact verification as primitive, we showed that we 
can define inexact and loose verification recursively. Differences between these versions 
of verification will play an important role in determining the truth-conditions for 
conditionals. Second, we assumed a world space, ܹ-space, which is a possible state 
space with a further constraint, since conditionals will be true or false relative to world 
states. We also assumed Exclusivity, but not Exhaustivity, since there will be certain 
indicatives which will be neither true, nor false. Now that we have taken stock, we will 
show how Fine introduces a counterfactual connective ൐ and its truth-conditions to his 
semantics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRUTH-CONDITIONS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS 
 
Upon this framework, Fine expands the language with a counterfactual connective ൐ in 
his 2012 paper (2012a). However, this is a non-trivial job and it gives rise to several 
complications that should be dealt with. I will follow Fine¶V VWepV, bXW proYide 
elucidation and discussion where necessary. Fine¶V main motivation seems to be able to 
accommodate the failures of what is called ³Substitution of Logical Equivalents´ 
(henceforth, Substitution) in possible world semantics, which leads to difficulties in the 
logic of counterfactuals (2012b).11  
We can again start from a more familiar ground and then make our way from 
there. In possible world semantics, a closeness relation is employed on worlds in order 
to evaluate counterfactuals. Roughly put, the idea is that a counterfactual 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 will be 
true, if all closest worlds where 𝐴 is true are also the worlds where 𝐶 is true and 
closeness is determined by a ternary accessibility relation ≼ on the domain ܹ of 
possible worlds. ≼ takes a centered world ݓ and roughly compare two other worlds 
ݓᇱ, ݓ′′ relative to ݓ and according to some interpretation metric defined on ≼. 
Theoretically, this induces an ordering relative to every element in ܹ. ݓᇱ ≼௪ ݓ′′ is 
                                                 
11 TZo noWeV: 1) When I Va\ ³poVVible Zorld VemanWicV´, I refer Wo DaYid LeZiV¶ and RoberW SWalnaker¶V 
accounts, as Fine does (Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968) and not use it as an umbrella term, unless I 
explicitly make the distinction between several accounts which adopt some version of possible world 
VemanWicV VXch aV GillieV¶ (2007) or Yon FinWel¶V (2001). 2) SXbVWiWXWion iV Whe principle Zhich VWaWeV WhaW 
we can substitute logically equivalent statements with each other in antecedent and consequent positions. 
The main reasoning behind this is that, since logically equivalent statements are true in the same possible 
worlds, the truth-value of the statement does not change. We will discuss Substitution in Chapter 5 in 
detail. 
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inWerpreWed aV ³ݓ′ is as close to ݓ as ݓ′′ and represent it as ݓᇱ ≼௪ ݓ′′.12 Of course, this 
is purely a theoretical way of putting the relation without interpreting in terms of which 
aspect the worlds are close to each other. For instance, if we interpret closeness as 
maWching Xp in WermV of laZV of naWXre, When Ze obWain LeZiV¶ (1973) inWerpreWaWion of 
the accessibility relation. Instead of working with a closeness relation, Fine introduces a 
transition relation: 
Transition Relation: Fine¶V informal definiWion iV aV folloZV: ³LeW XV XVe ݐ →௪ ݑ 
to indicate that ݑ is a possible outcome of imposing the change ݐ on the world ݓ´13 
(2012a, p. 237). The transition relation takes the exact verifiers of the antecedent, 
³impoVeV´ iW on Whe releYanW Zorld VWaWe and \ieldV ³a poVVible oXWcome.´ WheneYer Ze 
see ݐ →௪ ݑ, we are supposed to interpret iW aV ³u is a possible outcome of imposing t on 
w.´ WhaW doeV ³impoVe´ mean, though? WhaW I XnderVWand b\ ³impoVing´ iV analogoXV 
Wo RamVe\¶V now-ubiquitous idea in conditional reasoning: 
³If WZo people are argXing µIf p, will q?¶ and both are in doubt as to p, 
they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing 
on that basis about q.´ (RamVe\, 1931, p. 249) 
Instead of taking a belief and adding it to our stock of knowledge, we add exact verifiers 
of the antecedent to the world state, make the necessary changes in the world to maintain 
consistency and take the outcome as this modified world. If we are evaluating a 
counterfactual, i.e. ³If OVZald had noW VhoW Kenned\, Vomeone elVe ZoXld noW haYe VhoW 
him,´ Ze impoVe Whe VWaWe of OVZald noW haYing VhoW Kenned\ on WhiV Zorld¶V hiVWor\ 
                                                 
12 I am skipping various details aboXW LeZiV¶ frameZork, Zhich iV of no greaW imporWance for m\ 
purposes. 
13 This change talk should not mislead, though. Just as not every counterfactual has necessarily a false 
antecedent, not every transition relation induces a change on the world. 
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and keep the rest of the facts fixed. If investigations around the scene of crime yielded 
no information on the existence of other shooters, we obtain a possible outcome of no 
one else having shot Kennedy. This suggests that the counterfactual is true. 
However, these are the types of cases where there is a determinate outcome 
ariVing oXW of Whe anWecedenW. I inWend for ³deWerminaWe´ Wo mean WhaW impoVing Whe 
antecedent on the world does not yield outcomes which verify both the consequent and 
the negation of the consequent. However, not all transitions yield determinate outcomes. 
For instance, consider the counterfacWXal, ³If Mehmet Emin had flipped a coin, then the 
coin would have landed headV.´ SXppoVe WhaW MehmeW Emin always flips a fair coin and 
his tosses are stochastic events. Imposing the state of Mehmet Emin¶V haYing flipped a 
coin on the world of evaluation yields both the outcome of the coin having landed heads 
and tails. Since landing heads and landing tails are mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive events, the statements exactly verified by these states are negations of each 
other. For now, we will accept that there are mutually contradictory outcomes which can 
be obtained by imposing a verifier on the world and leave it at that. I will not consider 
these types of cases for Fine¶V account of counterfactuals, since this would prolong the 
thesis unnecessarily. However, when we extend the semantics to capture indicative 
conditionals as well, we will turn back to this and provide our resolution within the 
trivalent framework we adopted by dropping Exhaustivity. Now that we have an 
intuitive grasp of the transition relation, we need to illuminate what a possible outcome 
of imposing a state amounts to. 
Possible Outcome: Aside from stating that a possible outcome is naturally 
interpreted according to the type of counterfactual (future causal, backtracking et cetera) 
(Fine, 2012a, p. 237), Fine does not formally define what a possible outcome is. Without 
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specifying, we will define it in the most general way possible: a possible outcome of an 
antecedent is the way the world can be after we induce the exact verifier of the 
antecedent as a change on the world. If one wants his utterance to be read as 
backtracking, then the possible outcome will be yielded as a backtracking possible 
outcome. For inVWance, a backWracking coXnWerfacWXal ³If I had jXmped oXW of Whe 
ZindoZ, I ZoXld haYe died´ Zill be falVe, becaXVe I ZoXld haYe jXmped onl\ if there is a 
safety net dragged across where I would have landed and the transition relation will 
return possible outcomes which guarantees the conditions for me to jump, namely, a 
safety net dragged. Therefore, in general imposing an exact verifier on a given world 
state will produce possible outcomes which can be taken as future causal outcomes, 
backtracking outcomes et cetera. One issue, which plagues possible outcomes, are 
underdetermination. We have mentioned a case of underdetermination by giving the 
example of flipping a coin. I will not resolve this issue of underdetermination here, but 
merely acknowledge that there may be possible outcomes of imposing an exact verifier 
for some antecedent, which verify mutually contradictory statements. 
 Another issue arises in terms of interpretation of possible outcomes. A possible 
outcome can also be taken to be an epistemic possible outcome, which reflects the 
salient possibilities attended by a speaker, depending on the information possessed by 
the speaker or it can be a metaphysical causal outcome, which reflects the possible ways 
the world can be, depending on the laws of nature or fundamental laws Fine (2012a, p. 
237) naturally interprets the possible outcomes for counterfactuals as metaphysically 
causal outcomes, be that they are future or backtracking. We will see below that Fine¶V 
interpretation will not be suitable for our purposes. We will need further tweaking of 
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transition relation to capture epistemic outcomes. I will discuss the epistemic and 
metaphysical outcomes in §4 in more detail. 
There is also a general worry about notions such as transition relation and 
possible outcome which might be thought to be endemic only to these notions in Fine¶V 
account: They are too vague. I believe that it would be a mistake to think that 
conditionals are usually non-vague and determinate and only when vague notions such 
as transition come into play, conditional semantics become blurry, indeterminate and 
hazy. In fact, this was e[acWl\ Mackie¶V criWiciVm (Mackie, 1972, pp. 89-90) for LeZiV¶ 
original conception of similarity relations and non-monotonic engagement with 
counterfactuals. However, I believe that Stalnaker¶V reaction to these objections marks 
an important point admissible for the metasemantics of conditionals in general (1984, p. 
148). 
Mackie criWici]eV LeZiV¶ accoXnW, becaXVe LeZiV¶ accoXnW fails to eliminate 
vagueness and indeterminacy in coXnWerfacWXalV. Mackie¶V criterion of success for a 
theory of conditionals seems to be that a theory of conditionals must eliminate the 
vagueness of conditionals as much as possible and provide clear-cut and determinate 
truth-conditions for them. HoZeYer, SWalnaker diVagreeV and belieYeV WhaW Mackie¶V 
criticism is misguided in two important ways. Stalnaker defends Lewis¶ accoXnW by 
emphaVi]ing WhaW LeZiV¶ goal in the first place was not to eliminate the indeterminacy in 
counterfactuals; on the contrary, it was to recognize the wayward behavior of 
counterfactuals and give an equally flexible account to capture the inherently 
indeterminate behavior of counterfactuals.14 
                                                 
14 Fine¶V example (1975, p. 452) can be given as exemplifying this indeterminacy. Consider the 
coXnWerfacWXal ³If Ni[on had preVVed Whe bXWWon, Where ZoXld haYe been a nXclear holocaXVW.´ IW iV eaV\ Wo 
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I belieYe WhaW SWalnaker¶V defenVe can be taken a bit further. Stalnaker is right in 
claiming WhaW LeZiV¶ VXcceVV lied in capWXring VomeWhing aV indeWerminaWe aV 
counterfactuals in an equally indeterminate way and matching his theory to the 
indeterminacy of counterfactuals, while maintaining the connection between the theory 
and counterfactuals as lucid as possible. Of coXrVe, boWh Mackie¶V and an\one elVe¶V 
poWenWial qXeVWion iV ³WhaW iV Whe XVe of LeZiV¶ Wheor\ When?´ I believe that the use of a 
theory in general does not merely come from taming our use of a certain tool or concept, 
in this case, counterfactual utterances; it mostly comes from making the connection 
between counterfactuals and their formal modeling clear and precise or capturing the 
way counterfactuals are naturally used. If the use of counterfactuals is naturally 
indeterminate, then providing a theory which models the counterfactuals as used in an 
exact way would be an incorrect semantic theory for counterfactual reasoning. An 
analogy from physics may help us here: if the dynamics of a closed system is inherently 
probabilistic and indeterminate in certain aspects and allows for inherently probabilistic 
outcomes, then trying to construct a deterministic classical theory which allows for 
hidden classical variables or, in other words, does not allow for indeterminacy of 
measurement results will be an incorrect theory which will make inaccurate predictions, 
aV Bell¶V Whought experiment and AVpecW¶V reVXlWV VhoZ (Bell, 1964; Aspect et al, 
1982).15  
                                                                                                                                                
imagine a scenario where this is true²simply a possible world where Nixon presses the button and the 
Armageddon occurs. However, it is also easy to imagine a scenario where this is false, since the likelihood 
of a nuclear war is smaller than the button malfunctioning, when we consider the comparative total 
similarity of the possible world up to some past time t where the button is pressed to the actual world 
where the nuclear holocaust did not happen. 
15 I am merel\ XVing WhiV analog\ Wo illXVWraWe m\ poinW. I reali]e WhaW Bell¶V reVXlWV need noW be aV deciViYe 
as I make them sound. Those who are interested should refer to (Shimony, 2009). 
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The upshot seems to be that a successful theory of counterfactuals is not the one 
which eliminates the indeterminacy of counterfactuals, because that would require 
imposing unnatural rules on how people naturally use counterfactuals, but it is one 
which precisely models this indeterminacy. However, just because the nature of 
counterfactuals we construct a theory for is indeterminate does not mean that the relation 
between counterfactual utterances and our theory must be an indeterminate relation as 
well. To reiWeraWe, LeZiV¶ VXcceVV ZaV Wo model in a beautiful fashion the indeterminate 
way in which counterfactuals are uttered and used. I ZoXld like Wo VhoZ hoZ LeZiV¶ 
theory enhanced our understanding of counterfactuals and hoZ Mackie¶V criWiciVm 
misfires by employing another analogy from physics. We cannot claim that we are in no 
better position in our understanding the fluid dynamics with Navier-Stokes equations 
than without them, just because there are not always smooth solutions to these equations 
and we cannot predict precisely at which Reynolds number turbulent flows occur by way 
of these equations.16 Equally, we cannot say that we are in no better position in 
XnderVWanding Whe VemanWicV or XVeV of coXnWerfacWXalV in naWXral langXage ZiWh LeZiV¶ 
theory than without, because indeterminacy in counterfactuals persist. I believe that this 
argument equally applies for notions of transition and possible outcome. In our case, 
transition relation and possible outcome are tools to capture RamVe\¶V idea and Whe 
related indeterminacy in conditional reasoning. 
This line of defense for semantics of conditionals also works against a general 
worry about notions such as closeness of possible worlds and transition. The objection 
runs that notions such as closeness and transition themselves hinge on some sort of 
counterfactual or conditional reasoning in general, since imposing a verifier on a world 
                                                 
16 I am simplifying this process to the point of caricature just to make the analogy intelligible. 
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state may sound like a long-Zinded Za\ of Va\ing ³If Whe anWecedenW Zere Wo obWain, When 
the consequent would obtain´ (Fine, 2012a, p. 241). Fine considers this objection 
(2012a, p. 241), yet settles for a draw between his account and possible world semantics. 
We can proYide a general defenVe for boWh Fine¶V accoXnW and poVVible Zorld VemanWics 
along the lines sketched above. This objection rests on the same mistake as the objection 
againVW LeZiV¶ noW eliminaWing indeWerminac\ in coXnWerfacWXalV. We are noW Veeking a 
long-concealed kernel within the use of conditionals upon the discovery of which we 
will open the gates of semantic heaven for conditionals. We are just trying to capture the 
already wayward use of conditionals in a formal framework which could also tell us 
about how we conceive the logic of conditionals. In this case, relying on another if-
clause is not as problematic as it sounds, because it serves to illuminate what happens in 
other if-clauses. 
After this long detour on the issue of indeterminacy in conditionals, we are ready 
to provide the truth-conditions of counterfactuals by employing the notions of transition 
and possible outcome: 
TC: A counterfactual 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 is true if any possible outcome of an A-state 
contains a C-state. Formally put, 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 is true at ݓ iff ݑ inexactly verifies 𝐶 whenever ݐ 
exactly verifies 𝐴 and ݑ is a possible outcome of imposing ݐ on ݓ. Symbolically put, 
ݓ ⊨ 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 iff ݑ ∥൐ 𝐶 whenever ݐ ⊩ 𝐴 and ݐ →௪ ݑ (Fine, 2012a, pp. 236-237). 
However, as we have seen from the verification of atomic sentences, certain 
statements may have more than one verifier. Take, for instance, 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ൐ 𝐶. Suppose ܽ 
and ܾ as exact verifiers for 𝐴 and 𝐵 respectively. Now ܽ, ܾ and ܽ ⊔ ܾ are all exact 
verifiers for 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵. The question whether we should consider either one of these 
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verifiers or all of them to impose on a world state to obtain a possible outcome arises. 
According to Fine, we should consider all of them. He does this by bringing out two 
restrictions in order to define how we will determine which verifiers to send into the 
transition and how consequents are evaluated:  
Universal Realizability of the Antecedent (URA): 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 will be true only when 
it is true for any way in which the antecedent 𝐴 might be true (Fine, 2012a, p. 236). For 
a coXnWerfacWXal ³If he had Waken hiV pillV or VhoW himVelf in Whe face, he ZoXld haYe 
goWWen beWWer´ Ze Zill conVider not only the exact Yerifier of ³He took hiV pillV´ bXW alVo 
the exact Yerifier for ³He shot himself in the face.´ 
Universal Verifiability of the Consequent: 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 will be true, given some way in 
which A is verified, only when 𝐶 is verified under any outcome in which 𝐴 is verified. 
Take the same example: for the counterfactual ³If he had Waken hiV pillV or had VhoW 
himself in the face, he would have gotten better,´ Whe poVVible oXWcome of hiV Waking hiV 
pills may make it true that he gets better, while shooting himself in the face will not. 
Thus, the possible outcome is not universally verified of the verifiers of the antecedent 
and the counterfactual is false. 
These two rules will be crucial to the evaluation of conditionals in general. One 
may also realize that these restrictions make the semantics similar to that of a strict 
conditional. However, this should not immediately evoke the impression that the account 
will suffer from the same problems a generic strict conditional account does. The 
subtleties and idiosyncratic aspects of the account will emend most of the usual 
problems the strict conditional accounts inherit.17 
                                                 
17 There is a long story behind the strict conditional account, which I will not tell here. For a detailed 
survey and analysis, refer to (Starr, Forthcoming). 
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Let us demonstrate how we carry out the evaluation of counterfactuals with the 
given account. Take the counterfactual ³If Will struck the match or dipped it in water 
and struck it, the match would light up.´18 First, determine the exact verifiers of the 
antecedent taking URA into account: the state of striking the match in the room and the 
state of dipping the match in water and striking it. Impose these verifiers on the world 
state and check whether or not all of the possible outcomes of the verifiers for the 
antecedent inexactly verify the consequent. Imposing the state of striking the match 
yields an outcome which inexactly verifies the consequent. Consider the state of dipping 
the match in water and striking it: a possible outcome of this will inexactly verify the 
VWaWemenW ³Whe maWch Zill noW lighW Xp´, hence, Zill noW inexactly verify the consequent 
³Whe maWch Zill lighW Xp´. Since UVC is violated, the counterfactual will be false. 
Note that transition relation is the main apparatus to govern counterfactual 
reasoning for Fine. If the account will validate any principles, then it will be through the 
modifications on the transition relation. Fine duly recognizes this and modifies the 
transition relation to validate certain plausible principles such as Modus Ponens:  
Inclusion: If ݐ →௪ ݑ, then ݐ ⊑ ݑ 
Actuality: If ݐ ⊑ ݓ, then ݐ →௪ ݑ  for some ݑ ⊑ ݓ  
Incorporation: If ݐ →௪ ݑ and ݑᇱ ⊑ ݑ, then ݐ ⊔ ݑᇱ →௪ ݑ 
Maximality: ݐ →௪ ݑ only if ݑ is a world state. 
I will provide brief commentary on these rules. Inclusion makes sure that any possible 
outcome of a state imposed on a world state will include the state imposed. This settles 
the intuitive result that 𝐴 ൐ 𝐴 will always turn out to be true, since, when a state which 
                                                 
18 I am assuming a lot here such as the context of utterance does not allow for insufficient oxygen in the 
vicinity and other relevant assumptions, which are harmless for the example at hand. 
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exactly verifies A imposed on a world state w, whatever the possible outcome is will turn 
out to have the verifier of A as a part, i.e. for any ݐ →௪ ݑ,  ݐ ⊑ ݑ and ݑ ∥൐ 𝐴 will hold. 
Actuality ensures that, if the imposed state is already a part of the world, then the 
possible outcome is also a part of that world. Actuality validates modus ponens. 
Incorporation ensures that for some outcome of an imposed state, the outcome is still the 
same outcome, when the fusion of any part of that outcome with the verifier of the 
antecedent is imposed on the world state. This principle makes sure that Weak 
Transitivity is valid.19 For Fine, Maximality ensures the validity of classical weakening. 
For our purposes, it will also allow right-embedding of conditionals.20 
This concludes my précis of Fine¶V coXnWerfacWXal accoXnW. Taking VWock, Fine¶V 
account seems to track intuitive truth-values of the counterfactuals by blocking 
Substitution beWWer Whan a Yariabl\ VWricW accoXnW VXch aV LeZiV¶.21 LeZiV¶ accoXnW treat 
𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ ൐ 𝐶 as truth-functionally equivalent to 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶. That is, ³If Will VWrXck Whe 
maWch or dip Whe maWch in ZaWer and VWrXck iW, Whe maWch ZoXld lighW Xp´ and ³If Will 
VWrXck Whe maWch, Whe maWch ZoXld lighW Xp´ come out as equivalents truth-functionally, 
since 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ and 𝐴 will be true at identical worlds. Even though Fine claims to 
raise his criWiciVm againVW ZhaW he callV ³poVVible Zorld VemanWicV,´ he haV in mind onl\ 
LeZiV¶ accoXnW for coXnWerfacWXalV, Vince there are other accounts for counterfactuals 
based on possible world semantics which ma\ noW be WreaWed in Whe Vame Za\ aV LeZiV¶ 
theory. When we survey the literature, we find at least two of them: Gillies (2007) and 
von Fintel (2001). Even though Gillies and von Fintel has not addressed the problems 
                                                 
19 More on Transitivity at Chapter 5.3. 
20 For proofs of how these principles hold via the modification on the transition relation, see Fine, 2012a, 
pp. 239-240. 
21 There are oWher adYanWageV of Fine¶V accoXnW VXch aV YalidaWing SimplificaWion of DiVjXnctive 
Antecedents (SDA). More on this at Chapter 5. 
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arising due to Substitution, one may imagine the possible resolutions they will provide 
based on their resolution of what is usually called reverse Sobel sequences or invalid 
inference patterns such as Antecedent Strengthening. I will deal with GillieV¶ poVVible 
response to Substitution in detail at Chapter 5.1. Now, I will proceed to extend the 
account to indicative conditionals. 
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CHAPTER 4  
FROM COUNTERFACTUALS TO INDICATIVES 
 
Since we have the truth-conditions for counterfactuals, our job is now to extend the 
account to indicatives. This means extending our language L with an indicative 
connective ื. However, this is not easy, since we do not even have a distinction 
between counterfactuals and indicatives at hand. Even though counterfactual and 
indicative conditionals are boWh ³if, When´ XWWeranceV, we can come up with conditionals 
with same statements for their antecedents and consequents (modulo their tenses), but 
they may differ in truth-value and meaning. This is usually demonstrated with AdamV¶ 
examples (1970, p. 90): 
(1) If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else shot him. 
(2) If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have shot him. 
In general, we can notice both a grammatical and a semantic difference between (1) and 
(2). I will focus on the semantic difference.22 Though (1) and (2) share a syntactic 
similarity and similar statements for their antecedents and consequents, what they 
convey in meaning seem to be completely different. Intuitively put, if one wanted to put 
(1) in non-condiWional WermV, Vhe ZoXld XWWer ³Kenned\ ZaV shot´ or ³Kenned\ died by 
being VhooWing,´ whereas she would put (2) in non-condiWional WermV aV ³There Zere 
back-Xp VhooWerV.´23 What this tells us intuitively is that semantics of (1) and (2) differ 
                                                 
22 For a more detailed analysis of the grammatical distinction, see Khoo, 2015. 
23 ThiV iV one of Whe VWrengWhV of Yablo¶V accoXnW for indicaWiYe condiWionalV (2016). IW VeemV like, Zhen 
we logically subtracW Whe anWecedenW from Whe conVeqXenW in (1), Ze Veem Wo obWain ³Kenned\ ZaV VhoW,´ 
Zhich iV e[acWl\ ZhaW Yablo¶V accoXnW predicWV. HoZeYer, Yablo¶V approach doeV noW encapVXlaWe 
counterfactuals and does capture only a special form of indicative conditionalV he callV ³abVolXWe 
condiWionalV´ (2016, p. 4). 
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significantly. No matter what truth-conditions one ultimately provides for subjunctives 
and indicatives within any type of semantics, they should track these intuitions. 
At the outset, one distinction between indicatives and subjunctives seems to be 
with the semantic presupposition of their antecedents. One may say that the antecedent 
of (1) seems to presuppose the possibility that Oswald did not shot Kennedy, whereas 
the antecedent of (2) seems to presuppose the fact that Oswald actually shot Kennedy or, 
in other words, the falsity of its antecedent. This distinction may seem to capture how 
we use subjunctives and indicatives. Yet, we can show that it is neither necessary, nor 
sufficient to draw the distinction. One of the reasons for this is that there are 
straightforward counterexamples where counterfactual24 conditionals do not presuppose 
the falsity of their antecedents. Anderson provided such an example (1951; for further 
discussion, von Fintel, 2012): ³If JoneV had Waken Whe arVenic, he ZoXld haYe VhoZn jXVW 
e[acWl\ WhoVe V\mpWomV he acWXall\ VhoZV.´ AnderVon claimV WhaW a docWor ZoXld XVe 
this subjunctive as a premise for his argument that Jones actually took the arsenic. This 
meanV WhaW AnderVon¶V VXbjunctive is actually used as a premise to show the truth of the 
antecedent rather than the falsity thereof. One might also come up with other examples 
VXch aV ³If Vhe Zere depreVVed, WhaW ZoXld e[plain her Vilence´ (example from 
Williamson, Forthcoming, Chapter 1). I might utter this to someone to let her affirm my 
suspicion that she is actually depressed. Examples of this kind present strong evidence 
for the thesis that the semantic presupposition of the antecedents of counterfactuals and 
                                                 
24 One ma\ VenVe a Vmall inconViVWenc\ in Whe XVe; if Whe WiWle ³coXnWerfacWXal´ boWherV Whe reader, Vhe can 
VXbVWiWXWe ZiWh iWV lingXiVWic coXVin ³VXbjXncWiYe.´ 
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antecedents is neither necessary, nor sufficient for one to capture the semantic 
distinction between counterfactuals and indicatives.25 
If indicatives and counterfactuals cannot be individuated solely from their 
semantic presuppositions, we have to look elsewhere.26 It is usually expressed that 
counterfactuals express a metaphysically causal connection between their antecedents 
and consequents, whereas indicatives express only an epistemically causal one (Khoo, 
2015; Weatherson, 2001, p. 6; Zhao, 2015, pp. 496). It is generally argued that this 
distinction is marked by the tense shift in subjunctives or modal claims (Khoo, 2015, p. 
2). For instance, (1) is dependent upon our information of the facts. So, something like 
the following sounds in the ballpark: 
(1*)  For all I know, Kennedy was shot and If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, 
someone else did. 
This leads to the following corollary to (1*): 
                                                 
25 There is another worry about drawing the distinction in this way. Forcing the constraint on 
counterfactuals to have false antecedents leads to more serious troubles such as the categorical invalidity 
of modus ponens for counterfactuals. Certain counterfactuals may not contain contrary-to-fact 
antecedents, meaning that they might have true antecedents in the world of evaluation. Indeed, denying 
this would be denying counterfactuals modus ponens (Some opted for this option; see, McGee, 1985). Due 
to this distinction, one might think that modus ponens is naturally invalid for counterfactuals. Let me 
present how one might doubt modus ponens in this context and put this doubt to rest. In a situation where 
one accepWV ³If OVZald had noW VhoW Kenned\, Vomeone elVe ZoXld noW haYe,´ comeV Wo learn WhaW OVZald 
did not shoot Kennedy and retains his information that Kennedy is dead due to a shooting, one would not 
conclXde WhaW ³No one elVe VhoW Kenned\.´ He ZoXld jXVW reali]e WhaW hiV coXnWerfacWXal ZaV falVe all 
along. In a sense, if 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 is the counterfactual you assent to and you accept (in a slogan-like fashion) a 
counterfactual 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶 is true only if all closest 𝐴-worlds are 𝐶-worlds, then in the scenario above, you 
would be finding out that the closest 𝐴-world is an 𝐴 ∧ ൓𝐶-world, which forces your hand to reject your 
counterfactual 𝐴 ൐ 𝐶. Thus, the problem is not with modus ponens being invalid; the problem is with a 
false counterfactual you initially believed to be true. In another sense, counterfactuals are sensitive to 
actual data (the actual world is one of the possible worlds after all) and one would not drop his factual 
knowledge in order to accommodate her contradicting counterfactual. Instead, one would drop his 
counterfactual, if she learns that it contradicts her factual knowledge. 
26 I am Vkipping Whe diVcXVVion Zh\ a VeqXence of XWWeranceV VXch aV ³OVZald did noW VhooW Kenned\, 
#bXW if OVZald had noW VhoW Kenned\, Vomeone elVe ZoXld haYe VhoW him´ VWill VoXndV infeliciWoXV dXe Wo 
lack of space. The point is that it is a pragmatic infelicity, which is solely related to the order of utterance, 
but not to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. Conflating pragmatic and semantic infelicity is a 
cardinal sin. 
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(1**) It is not possible that Kennedy was not shot.  (Epistemic) 
(1**) expresses an epistemic impossibility along Whe lineV of ³according Wo Whe 
information I possess, there is no way Kennedy was not shoW.´ Yet, it does not say 
an\Whing along Whe lineV of ³according to the information I have, the world could not be 
VXch WhaW Kenned\ ZaV noW VhoW,´ Zhich requires a metaphysical necessity to hold and, 
accordingly, projects a metaphysical modality. 
On the other hand, consider the following: 
(2)  If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, someone else would have. 
And the corollary: 
(2*)  It was not possible that Kennedy would not have been  
shot.               (Metaphysical) 
The metaphysical modality is individuated by the additional layer of past tense in the 
noun clause of (2*). (1**) says that it is incompatible with my knowledge of the facts 
that Kennedy was not shot, whereas (2*) says that the world could not be such that 
Kennedy would not be shot. (2*) projects a claim about how the world could be such-
and-such as opposed to (1**), which projects what my epistemic status entails about the 
situation. The epistemic-metaphysical distinction carried by (1**) and (2*) are also 
carried by (1) and (2).27 
Above we have provided counterexamples to the thesis that counterfactuals 
necessarily carry false antecedents. This led us to conclude that the semantic content of 
the antecedent is neither necessary, nor sufficient to draw the distinction between 
counterfactuals and indicatives. However, this does not automatically imply that both 
                                                 
27 I am skipping possible fringe cases where subjunctives might have epistemic readings and indicatives 
might have metaphysical readings. For detailed discussion, see (Khoo, 2015, Chapter 2-3). 
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sides of the distinction (indicative anWecedenW¶V compaWibiliW\ ZiWh conWe[W and 
subjunctive antecedenW¶V incompaWibiliW\ ZiWh conWe[W) were unsustainable as well. We 
have only provided counterexamples to the potential claim that every subjunctive 
condiWional preVXppoVeV iWV anWecedenW¶V falViW\. In fact, the semantic presupposition of 
antecedents provides us with a good clue about how indicative conditionals come to be 
felicitous. Consider the following: 
(3)  Oswald shot Kennedy, #but if Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then 
someone else did. 
Preceding information in (3) eliminates the possibility that Oswald did not shoot 
Kennedy, yet the antecedent of the indicative in (3) requires the epistemic possibility 
that he did not shoot him in order to be evaluable. Khoo (2016, p. 12) argues that truth-
conditional evaluation of indicative conditionals should track our betting intuitions and, 
in this case, this argument provides us with strong evidence for the thesis that the 
antecedent of an indicative conditional must be an open possibility given the information 
presupposed for a speaker or conversational background. For instance, consider that I 
bet my friend on the following indicative conditional: 
 (4)  If Mehmet Emin rolled a prime number, then he rolled an odd number. 
Suppose that Mehmet Emin rolled the dice and informed me and my friend that the roll 
was not a prime. Now consider the following sequence: 
 (4*)  Mehmet Emin did not roll a prime, #but if he rolled a prime, then he 
rolled an odd number. 
After learning that he did not roll a prime, it is otiose for us to keep betting on the 
possibility that he rolled a prime and the bet would dissolve rather than determine a 
winner, if we learned that he did not roll a prime. The same intuition goes with the 
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evaluation of indicatives such as (3). If we came to learn that the antecedent is no longer 
a possibility, the truth-value of an indicative taking its antecedent as a live possibility 
would be indeterminate. If we have settled beforehand that the antecedent is not a live 
possibility, then the truth-value of an indicative goes indeterminate or what have you 
other than true or false. 
The upshot of the above discussion is that there seem to be two ways in which 
indicatives individuate themselves from counterfactuals. First, they force their 
antecedents to be compatible with the preceding information and, second, they express 
an epistemic connection between their antecedents and consequents. Even though we 
may not accept the initial distinction between subjunctives and indicatives based on the 
semantic content of antecedents completely, we can sense a grain of truth for the 
indicative part. (3) might be cited as evidence for the thesis that indicative conditionals 
require their antecedents be compatible with the foregoing information. Therefore, we 
can partly accept the semantic-content distinction by dropping it for counterfactuals and 
by adopting the restriction that the antecedents of indicatives must be compatible with 
the foregoing information in the context. Fortunately, there is an exact correspondence 
to this distinction in the literature. Will Starr calls it Stalnaker¶V DiVWincWion (2014, p. 
1024): 
SWalnaker¶V DiVWincWion: An indicaWiYe condiWional focuses solely on antecedent-
worlds among the contextually live possibilities, Zhich repreVenW ZhaW¶V being Waken for 
granted in the discourse. A subjunctive conditional focuses on antecedent-worlds that 
need not be among those possibilities, that is, they may be counterfactual from the 
perspective of the discourse. (for the original distinction: Stalnaker, 1975, pp. 144-145). 
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This is a plausible distinction, both because it captures the compatibility 
requirement between the preceding information in the conversational background and 
antecedent, and because it already alludes to the tools required to capture the epistemic 
connection. However, it poses two major troubles for us: 1) This is a distinction for 
possible world semantics, which cannot be taken as it is into exact semantics and 2) we 
have no defined notion of context. If we can define it, the notion of context will help us 
capture both the context-antecedent compatibility and the epistemic connection, since 
the notion of context will stand for the information presupposed in the conversational 
background. It will play the formal role of Whe phraVe ³for all Whe VpeakerV aW hand 
presuppose.´ For accounts sXch aV GillieV¶ (2009) or KraW]er¶V (1986), context 
determines the base set of worlds through which the conditional is evaluated. For the 
present account, it will especially play a role in verifiability, which antecedents will be 
admissible and, a fortiori, how possible outcomes will turn out to be. With the above 
discussion in mind, let us attempt at a formal definition of context under exact 
semantics. 
 
4.1 Defining context 
I find it a bit funny that, though the notion of context has slipped into most of the 
discussions in semantics and pragmatics with the definition that context is the 
information taken for granted in the conversational background, the notion itself was not 
clear and precise enough to be taken for granted. Funny as it is, the notion of context is 
the key component in contemporary semantics and pragmatics discussions. For instance, 
dynamic strict accounts (i.e. von Fintel, 2001; Gillies, 2009; Starr, 2014) take the 
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semantic value of utterances as their context change potential (CCP), which lays the 
utmost importance in their semantics on the notion of context and operations on context. 
One problem of defining context is that we have several candidates in the 
literature for the notion of context.28 For our purposes, a modified version of what is 
usually called a ³SWalnakerian conWe[W´ Zill VXffice (Stalnaker, 1999, pp.78-95). A 
Stalnakerian context is defined as a set consisting of the possible worlds which represent 
the salient possibilities (³liYe opWionV recogni]ed b\ Whe Vpeaker´ (1999, p. 85) relative to 
the information presupposed by the speakers. What this means is that speakers take for 
granted a given amount of information and this information rules out certain possible 
worlds from some given domain of possible worlds (1999, p. 86). In other words, all the 
worlds in the set bear the possibility to be actual and, as the context becomes better 
informed, the number of possible worlds as viable candidates in the set to be the actual 
one decreases. For instance, suppose we have a set of propositions, i.e. 𝐶 ൌ
ሼ𝑃ଵ, 𝑃ଶ, 𝑃ଷ … ሽ, which represents the information taken for granted by the speakers. Then 
the context is the set of possible worlds which remains after the given information rules 
out the possible worlds where the given information is false. Gillies takes a similar 
notion of context, which is a function from indices (say ܹ) to sets of indices (say 
℘ሺܹሻ), i.e. ݂: ܹ → ℘ሺܹሻ (2009, p. 337), though he says that his notion of context need 
noW be SWalnaker¶V (2009, p. 329, fn. 5). This function is supposed to return the worlds 
that are salient possibilities relative to the information presupposed. How does it do it? 
By removing the possible worlds which are incompatible with the given information. I 
shall formalize my own notion of context, though the idea operating in the background 
Zill be Vimilar Wo SWalnaker¶V. 
                                                 
28 For a survey, see (Stalnaker, 2014, Chapter 1-2). 
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Let us presume that all the information presupposed, the context set, is a set of 
propositions, i.e. 𝐶 ൌ ሼ𝑃ଵ, 𝑃ଶ, 𝑃ଷ, … , 𝑃௡ሽ. Our context will be the set of verifiers for these 
propositions. We can define a set of sets of propositions as ℘ሺ℘ሺܵ◊ሻሻ, since the power 
set of ܵ◊ will contain only propositions as sets of exact verifiers and the power set of 
that set will contain the sets of propositions. A function ݃: ℘ሺ℘ሺܵ◊ሻሻ → ℘ሺܵ◊ሻ defined 
as 𝐶 ↦ ⋃𝐶 will take us from a set of propositions to the set of the exact verifiers of the 
statements presupposed. If 𝐶 is taken to be the set of propositions, i.e. ሼ𝑃ଵ, 𝑃ଶ, 𝑃ଷ, … , 𝑃௡ሽ, 
then ⋃𝐶 will be the set of verifiers for these propositions, i.e. ሼ݌ଵଵ, … , ݌௡ଵ, … , ݌ଵ௡, … , ݌௡௡ሽ 
where ݌ଵ௜ , … , ݌௡௜ ∈ |𝑃௜|௏. Of course, speakers may identify certain statements to be false 
in the conversation. If we ascertained that a certain statement is false or it is commonly 
shared information that the statement is false, we can project this onto our definition of 
context by allowing the context set to contain falsifiers for those statements by putting 
݌̅ଵ
௜ , … , ݌̅௡
௜ ∈ |𝑃௜|
ி. Since a set of exact verifiers such as ⋃𝐶 will be a subset of ܵ◊, there 
will be the least upper bound of ⋃𝐶 by Bounded Completeness, which will give us the 
context state of our chosen set of propositions. Call this the context state ܿ. 
There are two fundamental differences between our notion of context and that of 
SWalnaker¶V. SWalnakerian conWe[W iV XVXall\ preWW\ hXge conViVWing of all Whe poVVible 
worlds not ruled out by the information at hand. The huge size of the context is normal, 
given the function Stalnakerian context is assigned. It should represent all the 
epistemically open possibilities and, considering the fact that we usually have a limited 
amount of information which can shrink the context only to a limited degree, the context 
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representing the open possibilities remains to be pretty big.29 Our notion, on the other 
hand, represents just the information presupposed and open possibilities are determined 
based on the compatibility between the verifiers of statements and the context state. We 
can say that a statement 𝐴 is an open possibility only if its verifier is compatible with a 
given context state ܿ. Then epistemically open possibilities in a Stalnakerian sense will 
be all the verifiers in the possible state space which are compatible with the context 
state, i.e. ∀ݐ, ܿ ∈ ܵ◊ and ܿ is a context state, if ܿ ⊔ ݐ ∈ ܵ◊, then ݐ is a salient possibility 
for a given context state. This will also mean that these open possibilities are situations 
which are candidates to be actual for a given world state ݓ.  
The second fundamental difference is that we represent falsities in the context, 
when the falsity of a statement is presupposed. In Stalnakerian notion of context, the 
function of an ascertained falsity is to eliminate the worlds at which this falsity is true 
from the context. In our conception, the presence of a falsifier for a given statement in 
the context state will be required, because it will guarantee the incompatibility of the 
context state with the verifiers of that statement. In case a confusion may arise, I feel the 
need to elucidate that I do not mean by the presupposition of a false statement the 
presuppositions which are false, yet presumed by the speakers to be true; I mean for a 
statement ߮, ³߮ is falVe´ iV preVXppoVed. ThiV iV a true presupposition, if ߮ is actually 
false and it will have a falsifier for ߮ in the context set. However, people can also 
                                                 
29 This is one aspect by which the default notion of Stalnakerian context disappoints. It is too idealistic to 
suppose that speakers attend to all the possibilities which are not ruled out by their information. Most of 
these possibilities never become salient for the speakers, as they focus their attention on the subject matter 
at hand. PoVVibiliWieV become ValienW, aV Whe\ are broXghW Wo VpeakerV¶ aWWenWion (VomeWimeV eYen WhiV iV 
insufficient, see Schaffer and Knobe, 2012). I believe that our definition of context does not suffer from 
this, since salience of a possibility is defined to be the compatibility between the verifier of some 
statement and the context. Furthermore, compatibility is evaluated case-base rather than totally. The 
compatibility will reflect the salience of some possibility and, if the compatibility has never been 
considered, then the statement will remain to be an open possibility, but not a salient possibility. A full 
defense of this comparison would take us too far afield. 
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presuppose false statements on purpose or by error. Therefore, we impose no factivity 
constraint on our contexts. They can contain false presuppositions along with true 
presuppositions given a certain world state.30 In summary, though Stalnakerian contexts 
and mine do the same job, they manage this job in the opposite directions. Stalnakerian 
contexts start with a limited amount of information and the size of the context is 
inversely proportionate to the amount of information presupposed by the speakers. We 
play the elimination game among possible worlds to ascertain the actual one relative to 
the information. In mine, we again start with a limited amount of information and the 
size of context is directly proportionate to the amount of information presupposed. As 
our context becomes better and better informed, the context itself tends to be closer to 
the actual world. 
This also makes sense, when we think about the definition of world state in 
Chapter 2. Since the ultimate goal of a context is to determine which world is the actual 
one, the upper limit of our notion of context will be a world state where an omniscient 
speaker will be presupposing everything that is actually the case in that world. If the 
context state and world state of evaluation are equal, then the truth-values of the 
conditionals at hand will be determinately true or false for the given context and world 
states. Also, if the context state itself were a world state, then we would not need any 
other exact verifier in the context to consider in order to settle the truth-value of any 
                                                 
30 Of course, the notion of truth will become gradated for indicative conditionals, since we dropped 
facWiYiW\ conVWrainW for conWe[W VeWV, Zhich ma\ render oXr accoXnW prone Wo EdgingWon¶V criWiciVmV (1995, 
pp. 306-308). D\namic VWricW accoXnWV VXch aV GillieV¶ (2009) aVVociaWeV Whe WrXWh of an indicaWiYe ZiWh iWV 
acceptance conditions. I will not atWempW aW a criWiqXe of WheVe accoXnWV or repl\ Wo EdgingWon¶V objecWionV 
in general, but merely say that the truth of an indicative conditional (simpliciter) will be established, only 
when given a context state, the truth of the antecedent and consequent is established in the world of 
evaluation. However, this does not mean that we have an anything-goes situation in terms of truth. The 
disagreements over the truth of indicatives can be objectively resolved by resorting to better and better 
informed contexts. Even though determinate truth-values seem to be at stake for the majority of 
indicatives, the objectivity is not. 
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conditional, since any state we wish to impose on a world state would already be 
included in it and the possible outcome would be the context itself. It is also too 
idealistic to suppose that our context state will be equivalent to a world state, because, if 
the context state is a world state, then an indicative 𝐴 ื 𝐵 will be trivialized in the 
sense that it will be just equivalent to the conjunction 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵, all of whose conjuncts we 
know to be true. 
Since we have a well-defined notion of context at hand, we can start employing it 
in other defined notions to extend the semantics to indicative conditionals. The notion of 
context will endow the account with an epistemic force. By this way, we will be able to 
accoXnW for Whe diYergence of AdamV¶ pair in WermV of WrXWh-conditions. In order to 
achieve this, first, we have to modify the transition relation in such a way that it takes 
context states into account. We can do this by redefining the transition relation: 
Transition+Context: A possible outcome ݑ of imposing an exact verifier ݐ for the 
antecedent on a world state ݓ will be yielded relative to a context state c. This will be 
represented by subscripting the arrow with the context state along with the world state, 
i.e. ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ. 
³RelaWiYe Wo conWe[W VWaWe´ iV noW aV lucid as we want and we must be more 
precise. In WhiV accoXnW, ³being relative to a conWe[W´ meanV WhaW possible outcomes are 
produced not only by the antecedent, but also by the information in the context. Hence, 
they will be compatible with the context, i.e. ܿ ⊔ ݑ ∈ ܵ◊. However, it will not be mere 
compatibility. Possible outcomes will restrict the possible outcomes to those which 
contain all the states in the context state as parts and exclude those who do not contain 
the verifiers part of the context state. For instance, if one is not entertaining the 
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possibility of some statement or event in the context or, in other words, there are no 
verifiers or falsifiers relevant to that statement, then there will be no possible outcome 
yielded with respect to it. This restriction will reflect itself in the account by including or 
imposing context states onto the possible outcomes as well. Inclusion of context states 
can be captured as part of possible outcomes yielded relative to exact verifiers of the 
antecedent: 
Context Inclusion: For all possible outcomes ݑ of imposing an exact verifier of 
some antecedent ݐ on a world state ݓ relative to ܿ, ܿ is a part of u. In symbolic terms, 
∀ݑ, ܿ, ݓ, ݐ ∈ ܵ◊, if ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ, then ܿ ⊑ ݑ. 
In a sense, Transition+Context works with a similar principle to that of modal 
bases in certain versions of strict conditional accounts (Gillies, 2010, p. 7; Kratzer, 2012, 
pp. 97-107). Modal base in those accounts determines the set of possible worlds via 
which the conditional is evaluated. Transition+Context restricts possible outcomes of 
imposing the verifier of the antecedent on a world state to those compatible with the 
context state. Transition+Context achieves two things in accordance with individuation 
conditions for indicatives from counterfactuals, as discussed above. First, it provides us 
with the framework upon which we can define the compatibility of the antecedent with 
the context. From the basic semantics, we already have the notion of compatibility 
defined on fusion of states. We can employ the same notion to define compatibility of 
the verifiers of the antecedent and context state. In particular, an utterance is 
semantically felicitous if and only if the exact verifiers of the uttered statement is 
compatible with the context state at hand, i.e. ܿ ⊔ ݐ ∈ ܵ◊. 
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Second, it achieves, in part, projecting the epistemic states of speakers in a 
conversation. Since the context state represents the presupposed information in a 
conversation, possible outcomes will track this information as well. In turn, possible 
outcomes will include or exclude states in accordance with the information presupposed. 
If we couple this with our notion of context state which reflects falsities, unconsidered 
possibilities and presupposed truths in their respective forms, then we should see that 
our possible outcomes will be epistemically causal outcomes dependent upon these 
presuppositions in the context and antecedent. Hence, these two properties of 
Transition+Context satisfy two desiderata of individuating indicatives from 
counterfactuals. 
We have no reason to force our context to be static throughout a sequence of 
utterances. If context is determined by what is taken for granted, then what is taken for 
granted must be shared via some communication. In an idealized form, if we assume that 
this communication is exchanged by declarative statements, then there will be 
propositions corresponding to these statements which will make their way into the 
context state. In a Ramseyan spirit, we will require that the context state be updated with 
the exact verifiers of the antecedent. This will mean that the context state will be fused 
with the exact verifiers of the antecedent. This yields: 
Context Update: If for any indicative conditional 𝐴 ื 𝐵, context state ܿ and 
state ݐ such that ݐ ⊩ 𝐴 and ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ, c is also fused with ݐ, i.e. ܿ ⊔ ݐ. 
This provides us with a limited flexibility in terms of capturing the evolving 
nature of conversations. Suppose we have an indicative of the form 𝑃 ื ሺܳ ื
ሺܴ ื ܶሻሻ and ݌, ݍ, ݎ, ݐ are the verifiers for P, Q, R, T respectively. While evaluating 
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this indicative, successive transitions in obliging with the truth-conditions will look like 
as follows: First, ݌ →௖,௪ ݑ; second ݍ →௖⊔௣,௪ ݑ′; third ݎ →௖⊔௣⊔௤,௪ ݑ′′ et cetera. Consider 
Whe e[ample, ³If Kripke iV aW Whe conference, When if PXWnam iV Where, When if LeZiV iV 
Where, When SWalnaker Zill be Where.´ While evaluating the indicative, add the state of 
Kripke being there, evaluate whether ³if PXWnam iV Where, When if LeZiV iV Where, When 
SWalnaker Zill be Where´ is plausible, do the same for Putnam being there and so on. 
What we are inquiring is whether Stalnaker will be there on the condition that Kripke, 
Putnam and Lewis is there. We cannot just forget that Kripke should be there for 
Stalnaker to be there, when we are assessing the plausibility of the indicative. Context 
Update lets us handily deal with McGee-type counterexamples to modus ponens 
(McGee, 1985).31 We also require that all of the exact verifiers of the antecedent should 
be fused with the context state. For instance, if we have a conditional with a disjunctive 
antecedent 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 and exact verifiers ܽ and ܾ respectively, then we will fuse a context 
state ܿ with ܽ, ܾ and ܽ ⊔ ܾ, which will turn out to be just ܿ ⊔ ܽ ⊔ ܾ.32 With this minor 
unproblematic rule do Ze capWXre noW onl\ RamVe\¶V idea, bXW alVo GillieV¶ (2009). 
Since we have laid out the basic machinery to be employed in the truth-
conditions for indicatives, we can provide them at last. For coXnWerfacWXalV, Fine¶V 
                                                 
31 McGee¶V Wrick Xnder oXr accoXnW cXlminaWeV in hoZ Ze appl\ Whe WranViWion relaWion in Whe flX[ of a 
Modus Ponens argument. For the conclusion McGee wants to obtain, the indicative in the conclusion of 
the modus ponens argument needs to be evaluated through the transition ݍ →௖,௪ ݑ, even though, while 
going through the modus ponens argument, we updated the context with the verifier of the embedded 
conditional premise. Therefore, it should be ݍ →௖⊔௣ ݑ rather than  ݍ →௖,௪ ݑ. This does not diminish the 
imporWance of McGee¶V reVXlW, WhoXgh. I belieYe WhaW McGee¶V reVXlW VhoZV WhaW an\ accoXnW for 
indicatives which do not take into account some notion of context is doomed to make incorrect predictions 
about McGee counterexamples. However, the detailed argument is left for another day. 
32 This operation is well-defined in our account due to how we formally defined our context. The context 
function will pick a set of propositions which includes 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 in addition to its preceding propositions and 
map it to its union. 
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designated truth-conditions were bivalent. However, we provide a trivalent semantics for 
indicatives by dropping Exhaustivity. Truth-conditions are as follows: 
ݓ |=c 𝐴 ื 𝐵   iff  ݑ |= 𝐵 whenever ݐ ⊩ 𝐴, ܿ ⊔ ݐ ∈ ܵ◊ and ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ, 
ݓ =|c 𝐴 ื 𝐵   iff ݑ =| 𝐵 whenever ݐ ⊩ 𝐴, ܿ ⊔ ݐ ∈ ܵ◊ and ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ,33 
 Indeterminate iff  otherwise. 
Though truth and falsity in our model is well-defined, we do not know what 
indeterminate corresponds to. The basic idea of ³indeWerminaWe´ is that under the 
unilateral concept of propositionhood, 𝐴 ื 𝐵 has an empty set of verifiers ஺ܸื஻ ൌ ∅. 
If we adopt a bilateral conception of propositionhood, then the falsifiers of the 
proposition will be empty as well, i.e. ஺ܸื஻ ൌ ∅  and 𝐹஺ื஻ ൌ ∅, i.e. ሺ ஺ܸื஻, 𝐹஺ื஻ሻ ൌ
∅.34 Note that 𝐴 ื 𝐵 will be indeterminate mostly due to the exact verifier of the 
antecedent and the context state being incompatible, since 𝐴 will have an exact verifier 
so long as it is not a logical contradiction. If 𝐴 is a logical contradiction, then both the 
outcome will not be a possible state, since imposing a contradiction on a world state will 
always yield an impossible state and 𝐴 will not have a verifier at all let alone an exact 
one. However, the incompatibility of the exact verifier of the antecedent and the context 
                                                 
33 This can also be read as ݓ ⊨௖ 𝐴 ื ൓𝐵, since the possible outcome will loosely verify ൓𝐵, when it 
loosely falsifies 𝐵, given that possible outcomes are world states by Maximality and the verification rule 
(ii)+. Therefore, the negation of a true indicative, i.e. ൓ሺ𝐴 ื 𝐵ሻ, will be 𝐴 ื ൓𝐵. This blocks one 
implausible rule of inference which is valid for material conditional, namely, Material Negation: ൓ሺ𝐴 ื
𝐵ሻ ⊨ 𝐴. This inference rule is known to lead to cheap proofs for the existence of God. For instance: 
 
 It is not the case that if God exists, he is not my father. 
 ²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²² 
 #Therefore, God exists. 
 
Since a material conditional 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 is equivalent to ൓𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, by negation of ൓𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 and De Morgan, we 
obtain 𝐴 ∧ ൓𝐵, which lets us derive 𝐴 by Simplification. This is a disappointing result and Material 
Negation should not reside in a plausible theory of indicatives. 
34 In bilateral conception, one can realize that if a proposition has an empty set of verifiers or falsifiers, 
then either there are no verifiers or falsifiers for that statement, which suggests that the statement is 
vacuous. This is a special case of vacuity in exact semantics. However, this vacuity does not lead to truth, 
because not even the empty state does not verify the indicative. 
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state will contingently arise. This incompatibility will not yield a true or false indicative. 
This, of course, intuitively squares with how we grok indicatives. Remember the 
discussion on rolling a dice at the start of §4: 
 (5)  He rolled a non-prime, #but if he rolled a prime, he rolled an even. 
(5) was counted as evidence that indicatives tend to obey the rule of semantic 
compatibility of their antecedents with the foregoing information as opposed to 
counterfactuals. Truth-conditions we have provided pay dividends to this distinction, 
since it assigns (5) an indeterminate truth-value due to the fusion of the exact verifier of 
the indicative and the context state being an incompatible state, i.e. ܿ ⊔ ݐ ∉ ܵ◊. This also 
means that the infelicity of (5) is semantic rather than pragmatic.35 
 This is one aspect of why we need the third truth-value for the truth-conditions of 
indicatives. Another reason can be seen by thinking in terms of determinate and 
indeterminate possible outcomes. Remember our discussion at transition relation 
subsection; we have left the discussion at recognizing that there are indeterminate 
outcomes of imposing certain verifiers. They emerge, when an exact verifier of the 
antecedent is imposed on a world state and two mutually contradictory outcomes are 
obtained. For instance, take the indicative ³If he flipped a coin, iW landed headV.´ 
ImpoVing Whe anWecedenW of one¶V flipping a coin (assuming flipping a coin is a stochastic 
event) will yield possible outcomes of both the coin landing heads and tails. In other 
words, the antecedent will not be sufficient to settle the consequent one way or another 
and leaves both possibilities open. We see that this issue is closely related to the truth-
conditions we have provided above, since the scenario is such that for an exact verifier ݐ, 
                                                 
35 Whether infelicity should be pragmatic or semantic is an open discussion. Gillies takes the infelicity 
sometimes as semantic (2009, p. 346), whereas Veltman takes the infelicity as pragmatic (1987). For a 
detailed discussion, see (Starr, Forthcoming). 
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it is possible that for ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ and ݐ →௖,௪ ݑ′, ݑ ⊨ 𝐵 and ݑ′ ⊨ ൓𝐵. This gives us for an 
indicative 𝐴 ื 𝐵 in a context state c, ݓ |=c  𝐴 ื 𝐵 and ݓ =|c 𝐴 ื 𝐵. What this means 
is that the indeterminate truth-value also captures scenarios where 𝐴 ื 𝐵 may turn out 
to be both true and false. It is easy to see that the cases where ݑ ⊨ 𝐵 and ݑ′ ⊨ ൓𝐵 are 
capWXred Xnder ³oWherZiVe.´ 36 
 The trivalent semantics captures an important aspect of how indicatives are 
understood in conversational settings. For instance, consider the following exchange: 
 Jack: If John flipped a fair coin, did the coin land heads? 
 Jill: #No.37 
IW VoXndV odd for Jill Wo Va\ ³No.´ Wo Whe qXeVWion, XnleVV Vhe knoZV VomeWhing definiWe 
about the outcome or the surrounding conditions such as the coin being biased towards 
tails. AVVXming WhaW John¶V flipping ZaV a WrXly stochastic event, the following sounds 
more felicitous:  
Jack: If John flipped a fair coin, did the coin land heads? 
 Jill: I don¶W knoZ. 
The felicity of the second exchange is supported by the third truth-value in our 
semantics. Jill ZoXld haYe replied ³IW eiWher did or noW did noW´ and WhaW ZoXld haYe been 
WrXe, Vince in an\ poVVible oXWcome, Ze obWain b\ impoVing Whe anWecedenW aboYe, Jill¶V 
reply would hold true, but with how the indicative stands as it does, the truth and falsity 
does not cut it. There is much more to say about the semantics of indicatives, but this 
                                                 
36 A non-modalized indicative which has an indeterminate truth-YalXe, i.e. ³If he flipped a coin, iW landed 
headV,´ ma\ haYe a definiWe WrXWh-YalXe, Zhen WXrned inWo an epiVWemicall\ modali]ed indicaWiYe, i.e. ³If he 
flipped a coin, it was possible that it landed headV.´ EpiVWemic modalV lie be\ond Whe Vcope of WhiV WheViV, 
but they can be captured with further modifications. 
37 Here I am assuming that the question is not asked in a betting environment. In a proper betting context, 
Jill might felicitously say ³No´ ZiWh Whe implicaWion WhaW Vhe iV beWWing on Whe poVVibiliW\ WhaW Whe coin 
landed tails. 
48 
 
should suffice for a general understanding of our framework. I shall now proceed to 
discuss the logic of indicatives which comes with our semantics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LOGIC OF INDICATIVES UNDER EXACT SEMANTICS 
 
If the present account were not to provide any advantages over several other theories of 
indicatives, then our project would be otiose. Fortunately, this is not the case and the 
account enjoys a pleasant logic of conditionals. Exact semantics offers a logic of 
indicatives which enjoys several advantages over other accounts. While showing how 
certain principles and inference rules hold under the present account, I will focus on two 
commonly accepted propositional theories of indicaWiYeV: GillieV¶ (2009; 2010) and 
SWalnaker¶V (1968).38 Normally, one would present a problem with a given account at the 
outset and construct a theory to solve it. However, I thought it would be best, if we 
collect all the principles and problems under one section where we deal with them on a 
case-base. Some of the principles will pose threats to the core of the semantics for 
certain theories where they need employ pragmatics or some other patchwork outside 
the semantics; some of them will be downright semantically problematic. Kit Fine 
questioned the possible world semantics as a whole by posing problems with its 
fundamental assumptions such as the concept of proposition being the set of possible 
worlds at which the statement expressing the proposition is true et cetera (2012a, 
2012b). Overall, if the charges stick, then these will witness as evidence that the present 
account should be preferred over them. Though the shift of semantics induces huge 
reverberations through all of the principles in the logic of conditionals, I will focus on 
three important principles. The importance of these principles comes from the fact that 
                                                 
38 I Wake SWalnaker¶V accoXnW aV Whe baVe accoXnW for an\ oWher Yariabl\ VWricW accoXnW for indicaWiYeV. There 
are VeYeral YerVionV of SWalnaker¶V accoXnW Zhich oWher philosophers developed further (see Khoo, 2016; 
Kratzer, 1986). 
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several otherwise plausible accounts provide different answers to the validity or 
invalidity of these principles. Some say that the inference via such-and-such principle is 
valid, yet it is pragmatically unsound; some say that it is invalid, yet pragmatically 
sound.39 The three principles I will focus on are as follows: 1) Substitution of Logical 
Equivalents; 2) Import/Export and 3) Antecedent Strengthening. After showing where 
they stand in the present account, I will discuss that the present account provides one of 
the most plausible solutions to the problems posed by these principles on the market and 
the main strength of the account comes from its robust logic of conditionals. 
 
5.1 Substitution of logical equivalents 
Since the works by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973), possible world semantics has 
shed light on one of the most elusive utterances in natural language²conditionals. Both 
probabilities of conditionals and their semantics have been dealt with in the framework 
of possible world semantics since their work. Even though several disagreeing accounts 
have been proposed in the framework of possible world semantics (see Stalnaker, 1975; 
Gillies, 2009; Kratzer, 1986), the disagreements among these accounts were generally 
on the issues of logic of conditionals40 rather than on the issues of the framework itself. 
Fine¶V objecWion (2012a; 2012b; 2017, Chapter 2, Section 3) Wo LeZiV¶ accoXnW of 
counterfactuals, on the contrary, was based on a problem with the framework of possible 
world semantics itself. Fine charged that possible world semantics validates the principle 
                                                 
39 For a detailed discussion, see (Starr, Forthcoming). 
40 For inVWance, SWalnaker (1981) defendV Whe laZ of CondiWional E[clXded Middle againVW LeZiV¶ accoXnW 
(1973) or Gillies, for instance, motivates his account on pain of validating Import/Export and other forms 
of Yalid inferenceV Zhich are inYalidaWed b\ SWalnaker¶V Yariabl\ VWricW anal\ViV bXilW Xpon VelecWion 
functions (Gillies, 2009). Yet, all of these accounts are proposed within possible world semantics. 
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of Substitution, which leads to counterintuitive results in the truth-values of 
counterfactuals. First, the principle of Substitution: 
Substitution: 𝐴 ื 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴′ ื 𝐵 or 𝐴 ื 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 ื 𝐵′ where 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐴ᇱ, 𝐵′ are 
logical equivalents of each other. 
Substitution is a principle deeply entrenched in the core of possible world semantics. It 
states that logical equivalents can be interchanged in antecedent or consequent positions, 
since logical equivalence in possible world semantics corresponds to being true at the 
same worlds. Though we will be concerned with a special application of Substitution, 
namely, the substitution of logical equivalents in antecedent position, the problem 
plagues possible world semantics in general. For instance, since the propositionhood 
expressed by a statement is defined to be the set of worlds at which that statement is 
true, necessary statements turn out to be the same set of worlds, namely, the set of all 
worlds, which implies that BroXZer¶V fi[ed-point theorem and 2 ൅ 2 ൌ 4 express the 
same proposition.41 
Fine brings out natural language counterexamples to Substitution in the context 
of conditionals. He, first, considers two counterfactuals with logically equivalent 
antecedents, but the examples are equally striking in indicative forms. I will engage with 
the indicative versions. Consider the following: 
 (6) If Sue took her pills, she got better. 
                                                 
41 This is a well-known problem for possible world semantics. Especially, Perry considers this to be one of 
the reasons why he proposes his partial approach (1986, p. 86) and Zalta argues that necessarily equivalent 
propositions should be able to be distinct; otherwise, we would lose our ability to represent belief (1988, p. 
57). 
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This is a plausible indicative which can be imagined to be true, given the right 
circXmVWanceV. HoZeYer, conVider (6¶), Zhich haV the logical equivalent of (6) in the 
antecedent position: 
 (6¶) If Sue took her pills or her pills and the cyanide, she got better. 
Logical form of (6) is 𝐴 ื 𝐶 and WhaW of (6¶) iV 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ ื 𝐶. It is easy to check 𝐴 
and 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ are logical equivalents.42 Assume that (6) is true, given the 
circXmVWanceV. WoXld WhiV enWail (6¶)¶V WrXWh? It seems to me that it does not. Intuitively, 
Vomeone ZoXld objecW aV folloZV: ³No! If Vhe had Waken her pillV and Whe c\anide, Vhe 
ZoXld die!´ (6¶) makeV XV conVider boWh horns of the disjunction and one of the 
scenarios seems to lead to the negation of the conclusion, which suggests that the 
inference from (6) Wo (6¶) iV noW Yalid.43 If your intuitions track this objection as well, 
then you would agree that there is something wrong with the principle of Substitution in 
the context of logical equivalents as antecedents. 
If Substitution causes problems for possible world semantics in general, then the 
problem should infect any theory of conditionals based on possible world semantics, 
since none of these accounts takes the definition of logical equivalence in possible world 
semantics differently from Lewis or Stalnaker.44 Therefore, at this stage, one general 
                                                 
42 If one has trouble in seeing this, just consider a truth table or set theoretic union and intersection for 
disjunction and conjunction respectively for any arbitrary sets of worlds for 𝐴 and 𝐵.  
43 ThiV objecWion iWVelf relieV on anoWher principle SWalnaker or LeZiV¶ accoXnW inYalidaWeV, namel\, 
Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA). If someone objects to this objection by holding that 
SDA is invalid, then we will see that it will be all the worse for her, since SDA is another principle for 
which variably strict accounts draw the short straw. More on SDA in Chapter 5.5. 
44 Of coXrVe, Whe jXr\ iV VWill oXW, aV mXch of Fine¶V Zork on WhiV remainV Wo be either unresponded or 
unpublished. However, one point is clear that failures of Substitution in the case of conditionals cannot be 
explained away with recourse to the discrepancy between surface form vs. logical form, since it is exactly 
possible world semanWicV¶ premiVe Wo proYide a more fine-grained conception of propositionhood than 
classical sentential calculus. The problem of Substitution seems to occur yet due to lack of a further degree 
of fine-grain. 
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motivation to propose and defend an account of conditionals in exact semantics might be 
that it blocks failures of Substitution. 
 For SWalnaker¶V indicaWiYe accoXnW (1968; 1975), SXbVWiWXWion iV Yalid simpliciter. 
Let me briefly show how this is so. Stalnaker adopts the possible world semantics and 
takes the definition of a proposition as the set of possible worlds at which the statement 
is true. He further defines a selection function ݂ which takes as its arguments the 
antecedent of an indicative and the world as it is and returns a set of the closest possible 
𝐴-worlds. Thus, the truth-conditions for an indicative 𝐴 ื 𝐵 turns out to be: 
𝐴 ื 𝐵 is true in ݓ iff 𝐵 is true in ݂ሺ𝐴, ݓሻ (Stalnaker, 1975, p. 143). 
When Ze appl\ WhiV Wo (6) and (6¶) reVpecWiYel\, we see that the function will return the 
same world, since Whe VemanWic YalXe of Whe anWecedenWV of (6) and (6¶) are the same. 
This will lead to an evaluation of the indicative through the same set of worlds, since 
⟦𝐴⟧௖,௪ ൌ ⟦𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ⟧௖,௪ entails ݂ሺ𝐴, ݓሻ ൌ ݂ሺ𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ, ݓሻ.45 Hence, SWalnaker¶V 
theory will validate Substitution and thiV meanV WhaW SWalnaker¶V accoXnW predicWV Whe 
truth-YalXeV of (6) and (6¶) incorrecWl\. 
 SWalnaker¶V accoXnW ZaV a Yariabl\ VWricW condiWional Wheor\. LeW XV conVider a 
dynamic strict theory to see whether the puzzle persists. One of the most influential 
d\namic VWricW accoXnWV in Whe liWeraWXre iV GillieV¶ (2009). For Gillies, the puzzle of 
Substitution might proceed in several ways. On his account, ifs play two different roles. 
First, they determine the subordinate context represented by a modal base determined by 
VpeakerV¶ information. We check whether the consequent is true in this subordinate 
context. Second, they restrict the modal base to the set of worlds where the antecedent 
holds to evaluate the consequent. Let 𝐸 be a modal base function which takes as its input 
                                                 
45 For fXrWher diVcXVVion, Warmbrǀd, 1981. 
54 
 
a context set ܿ and an index (generally, a world) ݓ and outputs a set of worlds 𝐸ሺܿ, ݓሻ 
which are compatible with the given information in c. If, first, determines a subordinate 
modal base with the antecedent of a given indicative, after it is determined by the salient 
possibilities, i.e. 𝐸ሺܿ ൅ 𝐴, ݓሻ for some antecedent 𝐴 and  
𝐸ሺܿ ൅ 𝐴, ݓሻ is to be just understood as ߣݓ. 𝐸ሺܿ, ݓሻ ∩ ⟦𝐴⟧௖,௪. This subordinate context 
should be understood as the shared information to which the information of the 
antecedent is added. Call WhiV ³Whe modal baVe determination function of if.´ 
The second function of if is to restrict the modal base with 𝐴-worlds for some 
antecedent 𝐴. If all the 𝐴-worlds in the modal base are 𝐵-worlds for some consequent 𝐵, 
then the indicative will be true.46 In symbols, ⟦𝐴 ื 𝐵⟧௖,௪ ൌ 1 iff 𝐸ሺܿ ൅ 𝐴, ݓሻ ⊆
⟦𝐵⟧௖ା஺,௪. Substitution should hold for Gillies, meaning WhaW (6) mXVW enWail (6¶), given 
that none of the functions if is assigned could prevent the equivalence of subordinate 
contexts from obtaining. Thus, nothing in his semantics47 precludes Substitution from 
being invalid. This is so, because Gillies takes the notion of propositionhood as the set of 
worlds at which a given statement is true, as Stalnaker does, and if the expansion of the 
modal is effected merely by mechanically adding the given set of worlds to it, then 
technically 𝐸ሺܿ ൅ 𝐴, ݓሻ and 𝐸ሺܿ ൅ 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ, ݓሻ should turn out to be the same, since 
they denote the same propositions under possible world semantics. Therefore, 
SXbVWiWXWion ZoXld be Yalid for GillieV¶ accoXnW and his account would give an 
unsatisfactory response to the puzzle of Substitution. 
However, Gillies may reply the same way as he does with Antecedent 
Strengthening (2009, p. 345). Gillies sides with Veltman (1987) on the thesis that 
                                                 
46 I am Vkipping qXiWe VeYeral deWailV, bXW WhiV picWXre doeV noW diVWorW GillieV¶ idea. 
47 As far as explicated in (2009; 2010; 2012). 
55 
 
indicatives imply that their antecedents are salient possibilities and that, when we add 
the implicatures of the antecedents to the entailments, the entailments must remain 
³happ\´ (2009, p. 345). (6¶) implieV WhaW boWh hornV of Whe diVjXncWion are ValienW 
possibilities and the entailment should not become unhappy, when we add either horn of 
the disjunction to the entailment. However, it is not clear how to achieve this. First, take 
the base entailment as: 
If Sue took the pills, she got better; 
²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²² 
 #So, if Sue took the pills or the pills and the cyanide, she got better. 
If WhiV Zere a happ\ enWailmenW, When adding ³SXe mighW haYe Waken Whe pillV and Whe 
c\anide´ Wo Whe enWailmenW mXVW keep Whe enWailmenW happ\: 
Sue might have taken the pills and the cyanide, 
 #If Sue took the pills, she got better 
 ²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²²² 
 So, if Sue took the pills or the pills and the cyanide, she got better. 
But let alone keeping the entailment happy, adding the implicature made even the first 
premise (6) itself seem false. Some might take this to be a satisfactory resolution to the 
puzzle. I do not believe so. This resolution relies on an unnatural use of language. I 
believe that we treat salient possibilities, as they are brought to our attention. For 
instance, I would treat (6) to be true, since I take the antecedent to be a salient 
possibility, that is, compatible with my context state and imposing the antecedent on the 
world state would have me conclude that (6) is a plausible indicative and can be true. 
However, I would WreaW (6¶) Wo be falVe, becaXVe Waking boWh hornV of Whe diVjXncWion aV 
salient possibilities would have me conclude that there are possible outcomes where she 
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dies as opposed to getting better. Shrinking and expanding the domain of the indicative 
seems to never yield the circumstances where this intuition is satisfied, that is, taking (6) 
Wo be WrXe, ZhereaV (6¶) Wo be falVe. Therefore, I take the above approach to be an 
unsatisfactory solution to the puzzle.48 
 The present account is designed to be compliant with the intuition given above 
and provide an unequivocal solution to the puzzle of Substitution. The solution is 
simple: Substitution is invalid simpliciter. Rather than trying to accommodate the 
wayward cases of Substitution, it seems to be a better option to reject it in a principled 
way. Here is a way of doing so. Regardless of whether we take a unilateral or bilateral 
conception of propositionhood, 𝐴 and 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ will differ in their semantic value 
under exact semantics, that is, the sets of their exact verifiers. For let ܽ be the sole 
verifier of 𝐴 and ܾ for 𝐵. The semantic value of 𝐴 will be the singleton ሼܽሽ, whereas the 
semantic value of 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ will be ሼܽ, ܽ ⊔ ܾሽ. Now consider the truth-conditions we 
have provided for indicatives with the principles such as URA and UVC. Since logical 
equivalents such as 𝐴 and 𝐴 ∨ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ have different set of exact verifiers and, by URA, 
we need to consider all of the verifiers of the antecedent, they will lead to different 
possible outcomes and one of these outcomes will falsify the consequent. This approach 
Zill make oXr accoXnW able Wo predicW Whe WrXWh YalXe diYergence of (6) and (6¶). 
 
5.2 Import/export (I/E) 
I/E is an intuitively plausible principle for indicatives. It reads as follows: 
                                                 
48 It is possible that Gillies can also tackle the puzzle with a different approach. However, given the 
machinery he provides, I do not see how else he would. It is somewhat an open question for his theory, 
since, as far as I am aware, Gillies has never taken Substitution to be a problem. 
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 Import/Export (I/E): for any given world ݓ and context state ܿ,   
 ݓ ⊨௖ 𝐴 ื ሺ𝐵 ื 𝐶ሻ ≡ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ื 𝐶. 
If Ze Wake RamVe\¶V obVerYaWion aV a ke\ Wo XnderVWanding Whe WrXWh-conditions of 
indicative conditionals, then there is no way that any account obserYing RamVe\¶V 
observation can risk invalidating Import/Export, since what I/E basically says is that 
there is no difference in adding the antecedents of the conditionals to our hypothetical 
stock of beliefs sequentially or all at once. In other words, when we check the truth and 
acceptability of indicatives, we assume their antecedents and evaluate their consequents, 
putting together both antecedents seem to yield equivalent propositions. For instance: 
(7) ³If Kripke is at the conference, then if Putnam is there, then there will be a 
causal-reference talk´ 
(8) ³If Kripke iV aW Whe conference and PXWnam iV Where, When Where Zill be a 
causal-reference Walk´ 
Despite its intuitive look, I/E has a checkered track record for conditionals due to the 
results it gives rise to. McGee countenances I/E against modus ponens for indicatives 
(McGee, 1985). Accordingly, McGee claimed that any account of subjunctives not 
supporting I/E would be a deficient account, because there is a plethora of evidence 
which supports I/E (McGee, 1985, p. 466). Against McGee, Katz charged that I/E is not 
valid for stronger-than-⊃ conditionals and modus ponens takes precedence (Katz, 1999, 
p. 415), but this cannot be right. Both KraW]er¶V and GillieV¶ WheorieV YalidaWe I/E and 
both are stronger than material conditional ⊃ (Kratzer, 2012, p. 105; Gillies, 2009, p. 
327). Gillies cites I/E as an independent reason why he provides his account (2009, p. 
325). Kaufmann also argued against the validity of I/E by claiming that the probabilities 
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of 𝑃 ื ሺܳ ื ܴሻ and ሺ𝑃 ∧ ܳሻ ื ܴ may diverge under certain circumstances 
(Kaufmann, 2005, pp. 213-214), which may throw doubt on the principle. I will not deal 
with each of these arguments, but simply show that the principle holds for indicatives 
under exact semantics and provide a brief discussion why the I/E seems to be 
indefeasible. 
Claim: ݓ ⊨௖ 𝐴 ื ሺ𝐵 ื 𝐶ሻ ≡ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ ื 𝐶 for any world state ݓ and context 
state ܿ. 
Proof: Left-to-right. Assume for some arbitrary world state ݓ and a context state 
ܿ,  ݓ ⊨௖ 𝐴 → ሺ𝐵 → 𝐶ሻ, Show ݓ ⊨௖ ሺ𝐴 ∧ 𝐵ሻ ื 𝐶. Suppose ܽ ⊔ ܾ ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 and ܽ ⊔
ܾ →௖,௪ ݑ, show ݑ ⊨ 𝐶. Given ݓ ⊨ 𝐴 ื ሺ𝐵 ื 𝐶ሻ, we have ݑ′ ⊨ 𝐵 ื 𝐶 for ܽ ⊩ 𝐴 
and ܽ →௖,௪ ݑ′. Since we have ݑ′ ⊨ 𝐵 ื 𝐶, then we have ݑ′′ ⊨ 𝐶 for ܾ ⊩ 𝐵 and 
ܾ →௖⊔௔,௨ᇱ ݑ′′. By Inclusion, we have ܽ ⊑ ݑ′ and since ݑ is obtained by imposing ܾ 
imposed on ݑ′, we also have ܽ ⊑ ݑ′′. Therefore, ܽ ⊔ ܾ →௖⊔௔,௨ᇱ ݑ′′ is equivalent 
to ܾ →௖⊔௔,௨ᇱ ݑ′′. Now, observe that ܽ ⊔ ܾ →௖⊔௔,௨ᇱ ݑ′′ entails ܿ ⊔ ܽ ⊔ ܾ ⊑ ݑ′′ and ܽ ⊔
ܾ →௖,௪ ݑ entails ܿ ⊔ ܽ ⊔ ܾ ⊑ ݑ by Inclusion. But then ܿ ⊔ ܽ ⊔ ܾ ⊑ ݑ′′ and ܿ ⊔ ܽ ⊔ ܾ ⊑
ݑ entails ݑ ൌ ݑ′′, since these are the only determinants of possible outcomes by being 
imposed on any world state ݓ and ݑ and ݑ′′ are world states by Maximality. Since we 
have ݑ′′ ⊨ 𝐶 from ݑ′ ⊨ 𝐵 ื 𝐶 above, ݑ ⊨ 𝐶, as required. I am leaving out the right-to-
left, since the idea is similar. 
We have partly seen that I/E holds for the account, but one may demand a further 
reason for why I/E being valid is a good thing for a theory of conditionals. One may 
subscribe Wo oWher philoVopherV¶ reaVons. I have mentioned above that Gillies (2009, p. 
325) takes one of his primary reasons for providing a dynamic strict theory for 
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conditionals is that it validates I/E unlike Yariabl\ VWricW accoXnWV (SWalnaker¶V being Whe 
prime example (1968; 1975)). AnoWher reaVon can be ciWed aV Whe principle¶V reVilience 
against counterexamples. Only Kaufmann (2005) has provided a counterexample to I/E 
in a probabilistic setting where he claims to show that the probabilities of 𝐴 ื ሺ𝐵 ื
𝐶ሻ and 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ื 𝐶 diverge. However, the counterexample has a problem of ambiguity 
in that the antecedent and consequent seem like they should not have the same 
interpretation, though their semantic values are taken to be the same by Kaufmann. 
BeVideV KaXfmann¶V, Where ZaV no coXnWere[ample Wo I/E Vimilar Wo coXnWere[ampleV 
raised against Transitivity and Contraposition (Stalnaker, 1968) and, given the 
conWenWioXV naWXre of KaXfmann¶V e[ample, I Wake iW WhaW Whe evidence favoring I/E 
outweighs the evidence disfavoring it. 
I conclude, then, that it is an advantage for any account of conditionals to 
validate I/E and our account enjoys this advantage. As long as one has a principled way 
of rejecting the undesirable consequences of I/E (i.e., McGee, 1985), there seems to be 
no reason to reject I/E and any theory for conditionals which claims to observe 
RamVe\¶V idea VhoXld be in a poViWion Wo YalidaWe I/E rather than invalidate it without 
bringing up a decisive counterexample to it. 
 
5.3 Antecedent strengthening (AS) 
AS might be one of the most troublesome principles, which haunts material and strict 
conditional theories of indicative conditionals, because it is the principle by which we 
violate our intuitive grasp of the truth-values of conditionals in the easiest fashion 
poVVible. Take GillieV¶ e[ample: 
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(9)  If there is sugar in the coffee, it tastes sweet, 
and its strengthened version: 
(9¶) If there is sugar and diesel oil in the coffee, it tastes sweet. 
The truth-value diverge of this pair is obvious. Dynamic strict theories need to employ 
pragmatic implicatures or some other method extrinsic to their semantics to stymie AS 
from holding for their theories and, a fortiori, accounting for the truth-value divergence 
of (9) and (9¶). SWalnaker¶V Yariabl\ VWricW accoXnW (1968) doeV noW YalidaWe AS, bXW iW 
does not validate Import/Export, either, which is almost an introspective reasoning rule 
for conditionals (see, for instance, Gillies, 2009; 2010). I/E was one of the reasons why 
Gillies developed his own strict conditional account with shifty operators and his 
account validated it simpliciter (Gillies, 2009, p. 344). However, AS was still a problem, 
aV iW ZaV a problem for VelWman¶V accoXnW (1987). The moral of the story for AS is that 
it seems with the current theories available to us that there is no way to prevent it from 
holding without going variably strict. However, going variably strict robs us of I/E. 
Thus, the natural conclusion is that a theory which validates I/E and invalidates AS is a 
better theory than one which validates both or does not validate either.  
So far the present account reads like a strict conditional with context applying 
specific constraints on the possible outcomes and benefits from its strong aspects such as 
validating I/E. Reading like a strict conditional account, the expectation is that it also 
validates AS and falls short of providing a semantic solution to the problem of AS. 
However, this is not the case. The current account invalidates AS by way of the nature 
of the semantics it employs and without any recourse to pragmatics or implicatures. This 
virtue comes from the distinction between exact and inexact verification in addition to 
61 
 
general verification rules for conditionals. I will illustrate how this virtue is achieved. 
First, the definition of AS: 
AS: 𝐴 ื 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵 for any C. 
For material conditional, it is easy to show why AS holds. Suppose 𝐴 ื 𝐵 is 
true. Then 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵 will be true either vacuously or having a true antecedent and a 
true consequent no matter which truth-value C has. For strict conditional, ⟦𝐴 ื
𝐵⟧௖,௪ ൌ 1 iff ∀ݓᇱ ∈ 𝐸ሺܿ, ݓሻ ∩ ⟦𝐴⟧௖: ⟦𝐵⟧௖,௪ᇱ ൌ 1, then for any C, ⟦𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵⟧௖,௪ ൌ 1 
iff ∀ݓᇱ ∈ 𝐸ሺܿ, ݓሻ ∩ ⟦𝐴⟧௖ ∩ ⟦𝐶⟧௖: ⟦𝐵⟧௖,௪ᇱ ൌ 1.49 Notice that the set of worlds for 
𝐸ሺܿ, ݓሻ ∩ ⟦𝐴⟧௖ ∩ ⟦𝐶⟧௖ will still either be a subset of ⟦𝐴⟧௖ or will be ∅ due to ⟦𝐴⟧௖ ∩
⟦𝐶⟧௖ ൌ ∅. In either case, B will continue to be true, because the set of worlds B needs to 
be true at will not ever expand, but only shrink or go empty. Therefore, the same story 
goes for any version of the strict conditional account: either vacuously or non-vacuously 
true. 
How does AS not hold for the present account? Since our verification is more 
fine-grained than the one in possible world semantics, we can employ the discrepancy 
between exact verification and inexact verification along with TCI to stymie AS. Fine, 
actually, hints at this opportunity, but does not drive the point home (2012a, p. 232; p. 
239). Fine¶V accoXnW for coXnWerfacWXalV YalidaWeV ZhaW iV called ³E[acW SWrengWhening 
(ES).´ ES readV aV 𝐴 ื 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴′ ื 𝐵 where 𝐴′ exactly entails 𝐴. Without much care, 
this can be read as the account unconditionally verifying AS, but that is not the case. I 
will show why this illusion might emerge and how it does not apply below. 
                                                 
49 Why the notation change? ⟦•⟧௖,௪ is a semantic value function which assigns sentential atomics or 
propositional variables to truth-values at a given context c and world ݓ. This notation is more prevalently 
used in possible world semantics, so I stuck to it.  
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For 𝐴 ื 𝐵, let |𝐴|௏ ൌ ሼܽሽ, meaning let ܽ be an exact verifier for A and suppose 
we strengthen the antecedent to 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵. Let us also suppose |𝐶|௏ ൌ ሼܿሽ. Then 
|𝐴 ∧ 𝐶|௏ ൌ ሼܽ ⊔ ܿሽ. In order to satisfy ES, we need to obtain ܽ ⊔ ܿ ⊩ 𝐴, since 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 
must exactly imply 𝐴. However, 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 only inexactly implies 𝐴 (i.e. ܽ ⊔ ܿ ∥൐ 𝐴), 
because ܽ ⊔ ܿ contains a part which exactly verifies 𝐴, which violates ES50 and there is 
no other rule which validates this transition from exact to inexact verifiers by 
strengthening. Thus, it is the case that 𝐴 ื 𝐵 ⊭ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵, since ES does not validate 
this strengthening and there is no valid inference in the account such as Inexact 
Strengthening which would read 𝐴 ื 𝐵 ⊨ 𝐴′ ื 𝐵 where 𝐴′ inexactly implies 𝐴. What 
this endows with the account is the semantic aspect to invalidate all of the 
counterexamples in the literature to show that AS is troublesome for natural language 
indicative conditionals without recourse to pragmatics. 
TXrn back Wo Whe GillieV¶ pair Wo Vee WhiV ViWXaWion clearl\. The anWecedenW of (9¶) 
only inexactly implies the antecedent of (9), since the verifier for the antecedent of (9¶) 
contains a part for the antecedent of (9), which does not get a pass for ES and no other 
role permits this transition. What this endows the account with is the virtue of 
invalidating AS purely on semantic grounds rather than subscribing to implicatures or 
pragmatic grounds (unlike GillieV¶ (2009, pp. 344-346) or VelWman¶V (1987)). 
There is another worry arising from the fact that our logic validates Transitivity, 
which is known to validate AS as a byproduct. There is a nuance here, which applies to 
all logics of conditionals in general. Even though it is not generally mentioned, there are 
                                                 
50 This may not be as obvious as I make it sound. The explanation goes as follows: remember our 
definition for inexact verification: ݏ ∥൐ 𝐴, if ∃ݐ, ݐ ⊑  ݏ and ݐ ⊩ 𝐴. Let ܽ ⊔ ܿ be abbreviated as ݐ. Now it 
follows that ܽ ⊑ ݐ and ܽ ⊩ 𝐴. Notice that this precisely satisfies the definition of inexact verification. 
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two types of Transitivity, known as, Weak Transitivity (Starr, 2014, p. 1044) and Strong 
Transitivity. ST is usually what is taken as transitivity, which is: 
Strong Transitivity: 𝐴 ื 𝐵, 𝐵 ื 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 ื 𝐶 
Stalnaker (1968) brings his objection to Transitivity based on ST.  His objection is raised 
via a counterexample and I believe that it can be explained away by sharp focus on 
context. Though his counterexample is not decisive to conclude that Transitivity in 
general is invalid for indicatives, ST gives us a bigger trouble than the counterexample 
Stalnaker provides does. This is because ST validates Antecedent Strengthening with 
some uncontroversial background logic. In order to see this, consider an arbitrary 
indicative 𝐴 ื 𝐵 as a premise. Since 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐴 is necessarily true by Inclusion, then 
by ST, we conclude 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵, which is basically AS. Weak Transitivity prevents AS 
from holding as a byproduct. To show this, let us give the definition of WT: 
 Weak Transitivity: 𝐴 ื 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ื 𝐶 ⊨ 𝐴 ื 𝐶. 
Run the same argument. Take again as a premise 𝐴 ื 𝐵 and take 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐴 as a 
necessary truth, then you cannot conclude that 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵, since you need to have 𝐴 ∧
𝐶 ∧ 𝐴 ื 𝐵 as an extra premise to conclude 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐵.51 Thus, this shows that the 
version of Transitivity valid under the present account does not imply AS. 
 The upshot of the discussion is that we seem to have identified a new way of 
explaining why the counterexamples to AS are legitimate counterexamples and why 
these inferences do not get a pass in the present account. When the antecedent is 
strengthened in those examples, their verification type changes, namely, from exact to 
inexact verification. Our framework supports Exact Strengthening, which forces the type 
                                                 
51 To see it better, write it explicitly as 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื 𝐴, 𝐴 ื 𝐵 (as opposed to 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ∧ 𝐴 ื 𝐵) ⊭ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ื
𝐵. For his counterfactual account, Fine dubs his principle as Transitivity, but, in fact, he takes it as Weak 
Transitivity (2012a, p. 240). 
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of verification of the antecedents to remain the same type, when strengthened. This is 
sufficient to explain the invalidity of the inferences in the literature and keep those 
inferences away from our framework. Thus, we see that the problem is not with 
strengthening per se, since our account also validates a version of strengthening; it is 
with unspecified strengthening. Another advantage is that we do not need any extra 
pragmatic explanation for the infelicity of these inferences, which is a big advantage for 
oXr Wheor\ oYer Whe d\namic VWricW WheorieV VXch aV GillieV¶ (2009), SWarr¶V (2014) or 
Willer¶V (2013). 
 
5.5 General remarks on the logic of conditionals 
We have shown above that the account validates I/E, which is an advantage over 
variably strict conditionals accounts and explains the counterexamples of AS usually 
raised against strict conditional accounts in a semantic and principled way (as opposed 
to, say, Gillies (2009) or Veltman (1987)). Though the present account validates its own 
strengthening called ES, ES does not admit any of the usual counterexamples of AS. 
Now, I want to show one more important result and make some general remarks on the 
logic of conditionals under our account. Afterwards, I will make a general map of where 
our account stands in terms of which principles it validates in general before concluding. 
First, let us see where the account stands in terms of one of the sacrosanct 
principles for a compositional semantics of indicatives usually called Indicative 
Deduction (ID) or sometimes called Upper Bound, since it is equivalent to strict 
conditional (Gillies, 2009, p. 327): 
 ID: If 𝑃 ⊨ ܳ, then ⊨ 𝑃 ื ܳ where ⊨ is loose (classical) entailment. 
65 
 
We can easily check that our truth-conditions for ื validates ID. To see this, assume 
𝑃 ⊨ ܳ for arbitrary 𝑃 and ܳ. This means that any falsifier for ܳ is incompatible with the 
verifiers of 𝑃. Then given an arbitrary world state ݓ and an arbitrary context state ܿ, no 
matter which exact verifier of 𝑃 we impose on the world state, we cannot obtain any 
possible outcome which includes the falsifiers for ܳ as part.52 Therefore, the possible 
outcomes for the verifiers of 𝑃 will loosely verify ܳ, which satisfies the conditions for ⊨
𝑃 ื ܳ for any arbitrary world state ݓ and context state ܿ. 
A stronger result also follows from exact entailment and truth-conditions of 
indicatives. Call it exact indicative deduction (EID): 
EID: If 𝑃 ⊩ ܳ, then ⊨ 𝑃 ื ܳ where ⊩ is exact and ⊨ is loose (classical) 
entailment.53 
Proof follows smoothly from truth-conditions of indicatives and the principle of 
Inclusion we have given for the validity of 𝐴 ื 𝐴. Suppose 𝑃 ⊩ ܳ. This means that 
every exact verifier of 𝑃 is an exact verifier for ܳ. Then for any world state ݓ and 
context state ܿ, imposing any exact verifier of 𝑃 on a world state will yield a possible 
outcome which will verify ܳ, since any imposed exact verifier of 𝑃 will be a part of the 
possible outcome obtained via imposing the verifiers of 𝑃 by Inclusion. But then any 
outcome obtained via imposing the verifiers of 𝑃 will verify ܳ. Hence, it will satisfy our 
truth-conditions for ื. 
 However, the other way around (if ⊨ 𝑃 ื ܳ, then 𝑃 ⊩ ܳ) does not hold, 
because all ⊨ 𝑃 ื ܳ tells us is that no matter which context and world state we 
                                                 
52 If it did, then the possible outcome would become an impossible outcome. 
53 Since we have not given the exact truth-conditions for indicatives, there will not be exact verification 
for indicatives. This can be achieved, but it is non-trivial and not clear what problems it will cause. Fine 
provides the sketch for defining it (2017, p. 575, fn. 5). 
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consider, imposing the exact verifier of 𝑃 yields a possible outcome which verifies ܳ, 
but this does not entail that every exact verifier of 𝑃 is an exact verifier of ܳ, since some 
exact verifier of 𝑃 may only be an inexact verifier for ܳ, when ⊨ 𝑃 ื ܳ holds. For a 
counterexample, suppose ⊨ 𝑃 ื ܳ and consider 𝑃 ൌ ܴ ∧ ܳ, i.e. ⊨ ܴ ∧ ܳ ื ܳ. 
Though  ⊨ ܴ ∧ ܳ ื ܳ holds, ܴ ∧ ܳ ⊮ ܳ, because ܴ ∧ ܳ will verify ܳ only inexactly, 
i.e. ܴ ∧ ܳ ∥൐ ܳ. 
 So far, so good. Even though Modus Ponens is valid in our account by Actuality, 
we can separately show that ื is also bound below by the material conditional ⊃. 
 Lower Bound: 𝑃 ื ܳ ⊨ 𝑃 ⊃ Q 
To see this, assume 𝑃 ∧ ൓ܳ is true at some world state ݓ and context state ܿ, i.e. 
ݓ ⊨௖ 𝑃 ∧ ൓ܳ . Show ݓ ⊨௖ 𝑃 ื ൓ܳ. That is, show ݑ =| ܳ for some ݌ ||- 𝑃 and 
݌ →௖,௪ ݑ. Since we assumed for any context ܿ, ݓ ⊨௖ 𝑃 ∧ ൓ܳ, then there are some states 
݌, ݍത such that ݌ ⊑ ݓ and ݍത ⊑ ݓ such that ݌ ||- 𝑃 and ݍത -|| ܳ.54 Since we have ݌ ⊑ ݓ, by 
Actuality, we have ݌ →௖,௪ ݑ for ݑ ⊑ ݓ. Now we have ݌ ||- 𝑃 and ݌ →௖,௪ ݑ, the question 
is whether ݑ |= ܳ or ݑ =| ܳ? Remember that from our assumption we have ݍത -|| ܳ for 
ݍത ⊑ ݓ. Since we have ݑ ⊑ ݓ from Actuality and ݑ is a world state by Maximality, we 
have ݑ ൌ ݓ. This entails that ݍത ⊑ ݑ and, a fortiori,  ݑ =| ܳ, as required. 
However, this brings out a more general question in the logic of indicatives: 
Since the account validates Modus Ponens, ID and Import/Export, how does it not 
collapse inWo maWerial condiWional, aV Gibbard¶V and man\ oWherV¶ collapse theorems 
show (Gibbard, 1981; McGee, 1985; Fitelson, 2013). Let me show briefly why the 
collapse proof does not follow for the present account. Collapse theorem basically says 
                                                 
54 ݍത -|| ܳ follows from ݍത ⊩ ൓ܳ and the verification rule (ii)+. 
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that if MP, ID and I/E is validated by a conditional connective ื, then ื and ⊃ will 
be equivalent, that is, they will assign the same truth-values, no matter whatever the 
antecedent and consequent are. We can show that ื and ⊃ will assign different truth-
values to same antecedents and consequents. 
Suppose that we have our indicative connective 𝑃 ื ܳ and the corresponding 
material conditional 𝑃 ⊃ ܳ, that ݌ and ݌̅ are exact verifier and falsifier for 𝑃 
respectively and that ݌̅ ⊑ ݓ. 𝑃 ⊃ ܳ is true at ݓ, since 𝑃 has a falsemaker at ݓ. Suppose 
also that imposing ݌ on ݓ yields a possible outcome ݑ which falsifies ܳ. This entails 
that 𝑃 ื ܳ is false by our truth-conditions, since imposing the exact verifier of 𝑃 on ݓ 
will yield a possible outcome which falsifies ܳ. Therefore, at ݓ, 𝑃 ⊃ ܳ is true, whereas 
𝑃 ื ܳ is false. This shows that ื is not equivalent to ⊃. This proof also shows an 
important aspect by which plausible theories for indicatives diverge from the material 
conditional. Consider the following utterance: 
(10) If that animal is a frog, then it is a mammal. 
Suppose that the animal in question is far away, but actually is a lizard. Then ⊃ assigns 
truth to (10). However, in our account, imposing the verifier on the world of evaluation 
yields a possible outcome which cannot verify the consequent, so our present account 
assigns falsity to (10), which is the intuitive and correct result for the truth of the 
indicative. No matter whatever that animal is in the distance, I am inclined to say that 
this conditional is false and the present account predicts this intuitive result. 
 One more alluring aspect of the present account is that it validates Simplification 
of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA).55 
                                                 
55 SDA follows directly from what is called under the current account as Exact Strengthening of the 
Antecedent (Fine, 2012a, p. 239). I will not take long to discuss why SDA is an intuitive and plausible 
68 
 
 SDA: 𝑃 ∨ ܳ ื ܴ ⊨ 𝑃ሺܳ/𝑃 ∧ ܳሻ ื ܴ.56 
Even though this rule is generally valid in the logic of conditionals, there is a famous 
counterexample to this inference rule by McKay and Inwagen (1977). Fine 
acknowledges this counterexample and defends the principle against the counterexample 
b\ VXbVcribing Wo ZhaW he callV ³SXppoVitional Accommodation´ (2012a, p. 232). First, 
the counterexample: 
(11) If Spain had fought for the Allies or the Axis in WWII, she would have 
fought with the Axis. 
ThiV VoXndV plaXVible and WrXe, giYen Franco¶V inclinaWionV dXring WWII. HoZeYer, iW 
would be a mistake to infer from (11) that: 
(11*)  #So, if Spain had fought for the Allies in WWII, she would have fought 
with the Axis. 
But it should be inferable given SDA. We can easily find indicative analogues of this 
counterexample. However, we do not need to in order to see what would go wrong in the 
indicative analogue. If we admitted an indicative analogue of (11) true, then our context 
would be updated with the indicative due to Context Update as well. Since admitting an 
indicative analogue of (11) into the context would also entail admitting the 
presupposition that the falsity of the antecedent of (11*) into the context state, (11*) 
would go indeterminate, since it violates the semantic felicity rule we have set up above. 
Fine also gives an analogous explanation for the McKay-Inwagen counterexample, but 
since he has not set up the machinery that we did, he settles for saying that it violates 
Suppositional Accommodation. This can be taken to be a general rule for weakening 
                                                                                                                                                
inference rule. The attempts to make SDA work in possible world semantics can be cited as evidence for 
the plausibility for SDA (i.e., Willer, 2015). 
56 𝑃 ∧ ܳ is included due to the assumption of inclusive disjunction at the outset. 
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SDA against the counterexamples: SDA is valid if and only if the antecedent of the 
conclusion is a salient possibility with regard to the context state at hand. 
 This concludes the general results and remarks I would like to make on the 
present account for indicatives. At the start of the thesis, I have promised that I will 
provide a general picture of the account, which includes which inferences are accepted 
in the logic. We can provide one which can be compared with others:57 
x Present Account: 
o Type of Infelicity: Semantic (Chapter 4) 
o Semantics: Exact Semantics (Fine, 2017) 
o Logic: Identity (Fine, 2012a, p. 239), Weak Transitivity (Fine, 
2012a, p. 240), Modus Ponens (Fine, 2012a, p. 239; Chapter 5.5), 
Exact Strengthening of the Antecedent (Fine, 2012a, p. 239), 
Inexact/Classical Weakening of the Consequent (Fine, 2012a, p. 
239), Inclusive Disjunction (Fine, 2012a, p. 238), Simplification 
of Disjunctive Antecedents (Fine, 2012a, p. 239; Chapter 5.5), 
Conjunction (Fine, 2012a, p. 238), Import/Export (Chapter 5.2) 
I believe that this list lacks the crucial implausible inference rules such as Material 
Negation, Antecedent Strengthening (especially, its projection Inexact Strengthening 
within the present account), Substitution of Logical Equivalents (in the antecedent form, 
as we have discussed it), False Antecedent et cetera. This list should suggest that the 
present account offers a pleasant logic of indicatives. 
 
 
                                                 
57 I folloZ SWarr¶V conVWrXcWion (ForWhcoming, p.11). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Now, let us take a look at what we have done, what we have achieved and what we have 
left wanting. Our general aim was to take exact semantics and counterfactual extension 
of exact semantics and extend it further to non-predictive and non-habitual indicative 
conditionals. This proved to be a heftier job than it sounded from the outset. We have 
distinguished indicatives from counterfactuals in a semantically salient way by utilizing 
the notion of context I have defined under exact semantics. The notion of context also 
turned out to be useful for defining the truth-conditions of indicatives. I have tried to 
show that the best candidate for truth-conditions is a trivalent semantics. This trivalent 
semantics enabled us to assign truth and falsity to certain indicatives, whereas leaving 
certain other ones as indeterminate. I have shown that this also fits our natural, everyday 
use of indicatives in conversational settings. 
 Afterwards, we have turned our attention to the logic of indicatives under the 
present account. I believe and I hope to have shown that the real strength of our account 
has shown through with the pleasant logic it provided for indicative conditionals. For 
instance, we have started from the ground with Fine¶V VolXWion Wo Whe pX]]le of 
Substitution of Logical Equivalents possible world semantics in general faces by 
appl\ing Whe VolXWion Wo Whe pX]]le¶V indicaWiYe coXVinV. FXrWhermore, Ze haYe VolYed Whe 
puzzle of Antecedent Strengthening without recourse to any pragmatic implicatures, 
unlike Veltman (1987) or Gillies (2009). We have achieved this by showing that none of 
the valid inference patterns in the account allows inexact strengthening, which leads to 
the majority of the counterexamples provided in the literature against Antecedent 
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Strengthening. We have also shown that our account validates Import/Export, which is 
an essential inference pattern, if Ze care aboXW preVerYing RamVe\¶V inVighW inWo 
conditionals. Aside from these, we have shown that the account validates the Holy 
Trinity of indicatives (Indicative Deduction, Lower Bound and Import/Export), yet does 
not fall prey to collapse theorems. This showed that our ื said more than ⊃. 
 So much for the advantages. Since indicatives are a vast ocean of many threats 
and treasures, finding many treasures does not let us cut our profits and up-anchor. We 
have not defined a principled way of capturing epistemic modals in antecedent and 
consequent positions. Though I believe that this can be achieved, it is not obvious how 
to do so from the framework I have provided. Second, we have not provided a way of 
embedding conditionals in antecedent position, though we have provided a way of doing 
so for the consequent position.58 This can also be captured, but we need to provide the 
truth-conditions for indicatives as exact verification rather than classical verification. 
Fine hints at a possible way of doing this (2017, p. 575, endnote 5), but we need to 
redefine the semantics altogether, if we want to capture this. For now, I accept the flaw 
and promise to emend it in future work. We have also provided no way of capturing 
probabilistic adverbs or adverbs of quantification. This can also be managed without 
making major changes in the semantic. Some of these aspects could not be captured 
merely due to lack of space rather than the inherent incapacity of the semantics. 
 Overall, it can be said that we have traversed some obstacles generally 
confronted in the literature of conditionals and we are a bit further ahead than where we 
started. Of course, many emendations and modifications could be attached to the 
                                                 
58 The catch is, since the truth-conditions for indicatives are provided with loose or classic verification and 
the verification of consequent itself is provided with classical verification, we can recursively apply the 
definition to embed indicatives in the consequent position. 
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account to make it better and I have no claim whatsoever that I have provided the only 
or the beVW Za\ of proYiding a VemanWicV for indicaWiYe condiWionalV Xnder Fine¶V 
semantics. However, I am hoping that the reader would agree that this is one admissible 
way of doing so. 
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